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1 OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we present the objective of this work, namely, to develop the founda­
tion for a risk-based approach to security assessment in electric power systems operations 
to determine operating limits based on risk. Particular emphasis is placed on security 
constraints associated with dynamic system performance. We present the need for risk 
management in today"s electric energy competitive market and how risk management 
may be used to balance system reliability and costs. 
1.2 Power system security; operational planning 
Our objective, to develop a risk-based approach to security assessment in electric 
power systems operations, is motiN'ated by a perception that today's deterministic ap­
proach to security assessment often results in costly operating restrictions that are not 
justified by the corresponding low level of risk. Use of a risk-based approach to secu-
rit\- assessment is therefore attractive because it offers the potential to allow operating 
practices that more ec[uitably balance the tradeoff between cost and security, resulting 
in substantial savings from use of less costly energy resources. 
Security problems most commonly manifest themselves in one of three different forms. 
Thermal overload of a circuit occurs when current e.xceeds the ratings of a circuit, and 
the circuit overheats due to the I^R losses, resulting in circuit loss of life and subsequent 
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damage. Voltage instability occurs when there is insufficient reactive power supply 
and can lead to unacceptably low voltages. The third form, rotor angle instability, is 
concerned with the system dynamic response following a disturbance in terms of the 
generators" ability to remain in synchronism. In this research we focus on thermal 
overloads and rotor angle instability. 
In general, security assessment in an operational planning environment seeks to de­
termine operating limits for a given system situation characterized by: 
1. system configuration: network topology- and unit commitment 
2. operating conditions: generation levels. line flows and voltage levels (obserx'able 
and controllable) and load levels (observable only) 
3. contingency set: a list of outage events 
4. performance measure: post-contingency system performance criteria 
Because a single study requires an explicit choice of configuration, conditions and 
contingency, and because the number of each is quite large, the number of possible 
studies is overwhelming. To reduce the possibilities to a manageable size and still ob­
tain useful results, studies are limited using a credibility criterion: only credible system 
configurations, operating conditions and outage events are considered. This criterion is 
not usually applied statistically but rather using rules of thumb and judgment. Second, 
a severity criterion is applied: here the analyst tries to identify the system configura­
tion. operating conditions, and outage event which result in the most severe system 
performance. Because this approach generally identifies a single event which drives the 
resulting decision, it is often called the deterministic approach. The deterministic ap­
proach is widely accepted in industry. It should be noted that the basic underpinings of 
the approach are probability (credibility) and consequence (severity), if only in a quali­
tative way. Therefore, the philosophy behind the deterministic approach is to appraise 
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the system situation using qualitative risk. In this work we develop the means of de­
termining operating limits using quantitative risk, where we measure the credibility of 
events using probability and assess its severity via its economic impact. 
In our method we still choose system configuration and operating conditions based 
on their credibility^ using engineering judgment, but we provide that the basis for 
decision making should be influenced by all credible events having potential to result 
in economic impact, and not just the most severe event. We replace the traditional 
performance mecisures. e.g.. stable or unstable for transient instability and overloaded 
or not for thermal problems, with expected cost over an interval of time or risk. The 
resulting acceptable operating region includes all operating conditions having risk below 
a specified threshold. 
1.3 Deterministic security assessment: how it works and the 
need to enhance it 
For a given network configuration (which circuits are in service and which generators 
are on line), system stability performance following a particular contingency is depen­
dent on (I) the fault attributes: type, location, and duration, and (2) the operating 
conditions previous to initiation of the fault. The operating conditions are characterized 
by load levels, which the operator can monitor but not control, and generation power 
outputs, transmission flows and voltage levels which the operator can both monitor and 
control. The operational planner makes an assessment of the system security level based 
on the current operating conditions by asking a series of "what iF questions, e.g.. "What 
if a three phase fault occurs on the circuit from bus 10 to bus 20, and it is removed". 
Normally, the cjuestions to be posed are predetermined off-line by using computer sim-
4n operational planning, studies are normally done only weeks or months ahead of the time frame 
for using the results. Thus, because of the short lead time, it is easy to predict which configuration and 
operating conditions are credible. 
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Illation to identify credible contingencies having potential to cause instability. These 
contingencies are referred to as the defined contingency set. A credible contingency usu­
ally includes any contingency resulting in loss of a single component (called an .V — 1 
contingency), and in special cases, contingencies resulting in simultaneous loss of two 
components (.V — 2). 
There are two levels of security assessment: classification and boundary determina­
tion. Classification involves identifying a particular operating condition as secure or 
insecure, depending on whether the postcontingency system performance is acceptable 
or not. for all contingencies in the set. Classification does not. however. quantif\- prox­
imity of the operating condition to insecure conditions. For this we need boundary 
determination. Boundary determination involves identifying the frontier between secure 
and insecure operating regions. 
Boundaries are represented by constraints imposed on parameters characterizing pre-
contingency operating conditions. We call these operating parameters the critical pa­
rameters (CPs). If the boundary is given as a function of two critical parameters, e.g.. 
the real power flow of two transmission lines, a nomogram may be used to illustrate the 
situation, as indicated on Figure 1.1. 
Insecure 
Operating 
Region 
Secure 
Operating 
Region 
Limited by 
Contingency 1 
P 
1 - 2  
(MW) 
Limited by 
Contingency 2 
^3.4 (MW) 
Figure 1.1 .A. nomogram 
o 
In practice, boundaries are often dependent on more than two CPs. Therefore, 
many nomograms are constructed for various combinations of the CPs not used on the 
axes of the two-dimensional graphs. Because this work is highly specialized, requiring 
considerable e.xpertise. and is also labor intensive, it must be done off-line. .-Vn approach 
has evolved in the industry for developing nomograms, and we refer to this as the 
deterministic approach. The deterministic approach typically adheres to the following 
steps: 
1. Study Parameters: Identify one or more study parameters for which a limit is 
desired. 
2. Base Case Model: Develop a base case model of the planned operating system for 
the period under consideration. 
3. Credible Contingency List: Develop a credible contingency list for each study pa­
rameter identified in Step 1 [1]. 
4. Most Limiting Contingency: Identify the most limiting contingency, or contingencies*, 
from the list, for each study parameter. 
5. Critical Parameter Set: For each most limiting contingency, identify the critical 
parameters, i.e.. the precontingency conditions that most influence the postcon-
ti agency system performance. 
6. Boundary Determination: Identify the boundary for each critical parameter as 
the level where system performance following the most limiting contingency first 
violates minimum operating reliability criteria. 
The criterion for judging operating point acceptability is then based on the identified 
limit. .-Vn operating point beyond this limit is unacceptable. Therefore, in theory, the 
"One contingency may be most limiting under some operating conditions whereas another contin­
gency may be most limiting under different operating conditions. 
6 
deterministic approach tolerates no risk. i.e.. the limits are hard. In practice, operating 
engineers sometimes decide to violate the limits, particularly if there is strong economic 
incentive to do so. It is this kind of decision which we want to quantitatively frame: the 
following example will illustrate the point. 
Consider that the deterministic approach requires that a very efficient 1000 MW unit 
costing S40/MWhr is constrained to operate below a limit of 900 MVV for the ne.vt hour, 
due to a stability problem resulting from a certain contingency. The cost of replacing 
the 100 MW is §SO/-MWhr. Thus, the cost of adhering to the constraint for 1 hour is 
the difference between the production cost with and without the constraint: 
([900 X 40 + 100 X SO] - [1000 x 40])1 hr = S4.000. 
On the other hand, consider that the plant is operating at 1000 MW. the contingency 
occurs, and the plant loses synchronism, but the remainder of the system remains intact, 
i.e.. there are no cascading effects, .\ssume it will take 10 hours to resynchronize the 
plant. During this time, it will be necessary to replace the energy at a cost of SSO/MWhr 
for the first 100 MW and S90/MWhr for the remaining 900 MW. The direct cost (there 
are other costs, but we ignore them here for simplicity) of the instability is the difference 
between production costs with and without the instability: 
([100 X SO + 900 X 90] - [1000 x 40]) 10 hrs = S490.000. 
The decision of whether to operate at 900 MW or 1000 MW requires an additional 
piece of information: What is the probability of instability over the ne.vt hour when the 
plant operates at 1000 MW? Let the probability of instability over the ne.Kt hour be 
O.OOS such that the expected cost of instability, or risk, is O.OOS x S490.000 = S3.920. In 
this case because S3.920 < S4.000. the best decision is to operate beyond the limit. We 
conclude that, depending on the relation between the risk^. defined as the product of 
^The expected monetary value [2] of a "gamble" witii several possible outcomes is the sum of the 
probability of instability and the consequences of instability [3]. and the expected benefit, 
it may be advantageous to violate the deterministic limit by operating at 1000 MW. 
1.4 Need for risk management: system reliability and its cost 
The electric energ>^ industry is expected to economically supply energ\- on demand 
without local failures or large-scale blackouts. To achieve this objective engineers need 
to assess and maintain or improve the reliability"* of the electric power system while 
balancing reliability cost and reliability worth. Any player of today's competitive electric 
energy market which can adequately assess and balance its system reliability cost and 
reliability worth will have an advantage over its competitors since this player will be able 
to answer the question: "How much and in what way should money be spent in order 
to optimize the level of reliability ?". The answer to this question allows achieving a 
reliable level of operation at reasonable costs. Failure to answer the question results in 
short-term savings at the expense of lower reliability or excessive expenditures to achieve 
an unnecessarily high level of reliability: the former may undermine customers trust in 
the company's ability to serve its needs, the latter will divert the company's resources 
from more profitable activities. 
We use the risk of operating at a given operating point, i.e. the expected cost of 
operating at a given operating point, to evaluate system reliability cost/reliability worth. 
Our measure of reliability is indirect since we calculate the probability of failure rather 
products of monetary worth of each possible outcome and its probability. The probability of instability 
j equals the probability of suffering the impact associated with instability j. Therefore, the e.xpected 
benefit minus the composite risk, the sum of the products of the impact associated with instability j. 
in dollars, and the probability of suffering that impact gives the expected monetary value of operating 
at point p for instability j. 
•^Reliability is the probability of a device or system performing its purpose adequately for the period 
of time intended under the operating conditions encountered [4], Reliability, in a bulk power electric 
system, is the degree to which the performance of the elements of that system results in power being 
delivered to consumers within accepted standards and in the amount desired. The degree of reliability 
has been measured by the frequency, duration, and magnitude of adverse effects on consumer service. 
It is commonly thought to include two main components: adequacy, which is the ability to supply the 
demand, and security, which is the ability to respond to disturbances in an acceptable fashion [5]. 
s 
than the probability of successful operation and use the economic impact of this failure 
to appraise the cost of unreliability. Economic impact is a major component of our 
method and is concerned with all costs: generation owner costs, transmission owner 
costs, customers costs and societal costs. 
1.5 Risk-based security assessment 
Risk is defined as the product of probability and impact 
R  =  P x I  (1.1) 
Higher values of R indicate higher values of risk. 
The risk-based approach builds from the deterministic approach in that steps 1. 2 
and 3 are retained. However, the risk-based approach departs from the deterministic ap­
proach in the following fundamental way. Whereas the deterministic approach develops 
limits based on the most severe contingencies, the risk-based approach develops limits 
based on a composite measure computed from a risk contribution from all contingencies 
in the list, where risk is the product of probability and consequence. Therefore, in the 
risk-based approach, analysis is required for all contingencies in the list and not just the 
most severe. Although this requirement could result in additional labor, this is a rea­
sonable price to pay to gain the benefits associated with a more quantitative assessment 
of the security versus economy tradeoff. 
The main difference in the two approaches resides not in the methods used to obtain 
results regarding system performance following a specific contingency: indeed the same 
methods are required in both approaches. Instead, the main difference in the two ap­
proaches resides in the criterion used to judge operating point acceptability. VV'herecis 
one uses a deterministic criterion (secure or insecure for most severe contingency under 
worst-case disturbance scenario), the other uses a criterion based on probability and 
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consequence (composite risk level from all contingencies). Therefore the risk-based ap­
proach does not necessarily replace the deterministic approach: it extends it. One of 
the appeals of this approach is ease of transition for system operators: the change is 
transparent to the operators except for new graphs and tables. 
1.6 Work done in this dissertation 
In this work we develop a method that provides risk-based securit\- assessment in an 
operating environment considering any type of security violation. Particular emphasis is 
placed on security constraints associated with dynamic system performance. Our work 
is motivated by a perception that today's deterministic approach to security assessment 
often results in costly operating restrictions that are not justified by the corresponding 
low level of risk. .A. risk-based approach to security assessment is attractive because it 
balances the system's reliability cost and reliability worth. 
Our method allows determination of operating limits based on the risk of insecurity at 
a given operating point. We characterize the operating point in terms of pre-contingency 
controllable parameters, the critical parameter set. that most influence the postcontin-
gency system performance. Total risk at a given operating point is obtained summing 
over all the individual risk associated with defined security violations and their corre­
sponding triggering events. We develop risk expressions that account for fully reliable 
conventional protection equipment and for main breakers passive and active failures. 
This dissertation introduces the concept of limiting operating point functions, curves 
that give limiting values of the critical parameter for various fault locations on a line 
and characterize the dependency of operating limit on fault type and fault location. The 
limiting operating point functions combine system stability performance and probability 
of instability information. This dissertation includes a detailed study on how e.xcitation 
systems and other parameters affect limiting operating point functions. We also develop. 
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using probability theory, expressions to calculate the conditional probability of insecurity 
given a fault occurs for thermal overloads and two approaches for computing probability 
of transient instability: one based on Law of Total Probability and the other on Cartesian 
products. 
Finally, we use a modified version of the IEEE Reliability Test System to illustrate 
risk-based electric power system security assessment and to compare it with traditional 
deterministic security assessment. We determine operating limits using iso-risk con­
tours drawn in the space of pre-contingency controllable parameters, effectively creating 
nomograms based on risk. The contours of constant risk in the space of operating pa­
rameters provide a risk management tool that allows managers to justify decisions to 
operate beyond deterministic operating limits when it is economically advantageous to 
do so. The tool may also be useful in providing justification of constraints enforced to 
maintain security levels when these are challenged by a participant penalized as a result 
of them. 
1.7 Organization of this dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows: chapter I presents an overview of the work, 
chapter 2 is a literature survey, in chapter 3 our method to calculate the risk of an 
operating point is presented, chapter 4 presents the limiting point functions and their 
effect on probability of instability, chapter o presents a risk management e.Kample us­
ing a modified IEEE Reliability Test System and chapter 6 provides conclusions and 
suggestions for future work. 
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2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of previous work on probabilistic security assessment 
and protective equipment reliability. 
2.2 Probabilistic stability cissessment 
A review of previous work on probabilistic stabih'ty assessment indicates a consid­
erable amount of literature is available: a sample of the main approaches dealing with 
security are referenced in what follows. 
.Anderson. Bose. and colleagues [6. 7] outlined a procedure to obtain a transient stabil­
ity probability function through unspecified non-linear transformations of the probability 
distributions, or densities, of disturbance location, type and sequence. Conceptually, an 
n"* order joint density function of the random process is obtained via this transformation 
but the authors preferred to employ Monte Carlo simulation in their computation [S]. 
Billinton and Kuruganty [9. 10. 11] compute probability of stability based on reli­
ability of fault clearing devices, the time needed for successfully clearing a fault being 
less than the critical clearing time, and probabilistic representation of fault location and 
fault type. .A. similar approach is followed by Hsu and Chang [12] who obtain the prob­
ability of system instability as the probability of critical clearing time of a certain fault 
event being less that the actual clearing time for that fault event. 
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VVu et aL [13] propose an approach based on a time to insecurity. In this approach 
the dynamic security region with respect to a fault is the set of injections for which 
the system is transiently stable. The time to insecurity is the first instant at which the 
injection leaves the corresponding security region. The probability distribution of the 
time to insecurity is e.xpressed in terms of the configuration of the system at time t and 
the transition probabilities to other possible states. .A.lthough theoretically sound, at the 
moment of applying it. the approach requires determining the steady-state and dynamic 
security regions for each point of operation. The derivation of the probability function 
of time to insecurity recjuires knowledge of these regions. This is a major difference from 
our approach, we use probability of instability to determine operating security regions, 
i.e.. to determine operating limits. 
Leite da Silva et al. [14} develop a framework for integrating adequacy and security 
assessment, resulting in computation of probabilistic indices for predisturbance condi­
tions. In their work system states are classified according to the impact of a disturbance 
and transition rates between states (Markovian) are used to characterize the stochastic 
nature of how each state is reached. Security is measured in terms of the probability 
of clearing a fault before critical clearing time is reached. This method uses the impact 
of the disturbance to classify the states of the system, thus incorporating impact of 
the disturbance within the probability of insecurity calculation. We use impact of the 
disturbance to calculate risk of an operating point, the probability of the event and its 
impact are decoupled up to the point of calculating risk. 
Counan et al. [15] devise a defense plan against extremely low probability but very 
severe system collapse mechanisms. Such a defense plan may be complementary to the 
risk based security strategy proposed here in order to account for the extremely low 
probability events which may result in very severe impacts. 
The IEEE PES .A.PM Working Group [16] presents a broad assessment of trends and 
needs in reliability practices: one of the needs identified was a risk assessment index for 
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power system operation. 
2.3 Protective equipment reliability 
A secure system may only be achieved via reliable protective equipment. Defective-
poorly-maintained or mis-calibrated protective equipment may cause severe security 
violations costing up to hundred of millions dollars. In our work we study the effect 
of protective equipment reliability on risk. Most security assessment studies assume 
fully reliable protective equipment, thus we provide a risk expression that follows this 
assumption. We also consider the possibility of protective equipment failure, resulting 
in higher impact for the same triggering event, and provide a risk e.xpression for this 
situation as well. The following is a representative sample of protective equipment 
reliability literature. 
The IEEE .A.PM Task Force Report on Protective Systems Reliability [17] identified 
two types of protection schemes: conventional (component protection) and special (sys­
tem protection). The report focus on the first and identifies two major failure modes of 
breakers or protection systems: failure to operate when the operation is called for and 
false tripping operation. Four methods for evaluating the effects of protection .system 
malfunctions on the operation of power systems are briefly reviewed. These are: 1) 
adjusting the failure rates of protected components. 2) circuit breaker models. 3) event 
tree method, and 4) Monte Carlo method. 
Kuruganty and Billinton [IS] use probability density functions of the operating times 
associated with the components of the protection system such as relays, breakers, etc. 
These are assumed and used in conjunction with the reliabilities of the main and backup 
protection schemes to obtain the pdf of the fault clearing time. These densities are used 
together with the critical clearing time, conceivably for any fault type and location, to 
obtain a probability index for transient instability. 
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P.M. Anderson [19] mecisures reliability of a protection system as the probability 
of successful operation of the system. Failures are divided into operational failure, a 
failure to operate when it should, and security failure, initiating an unnecessary or 
unwanted operation when there is no fault in the relay's protective zone. Anderson uses 
basic series and parallel systems reliability calculations to model redundant relay-breaker 
configurations as well as different typical power system relay and circuit breaker control 
configurations. 
Anderson s paper represents, in our opinion, the best reference on how to calculate 
the probability of protection system failure taking into account components reliability 
and system configuration: it uses failure modes and effect analysis method. Later in 
this work we include the probability of protection system failure in our risk expression 
and suggest the use of the method presented by .Anderson to calculate the necessary 
probabilities. The following is a summary of Anderson's paper. 
2.3.1 Failure modes and effect analysis of conventional protection sys­
tems 
.A. fully redundant protection system installation is shown in Figure 2.1. .A. more 
common protective system configuration for high voltage transmission systems is similar 
to that of Figure 2.2-1. where parallel redundancy is employed in the relays but a single 
circuit breaker trip coil and breaker trip mechanism is used. 
In order to perform analysis, a s y s t e m  configuration must be assumed. We consider 
three control configurations, with different degrees of redundancy, shown in Figure 2.2. 
Each control configuration assumes a single battery supply, a single breaker mechanism, 
and parallel redundant relays. Control configuration ^2 provides redundant current 
transformers (CT) and potential transformers (PT). Control configuration #3 provides 
redundant circuit breaker trip coils, in addition to the redundancies of configuration #2. 
These three control configurations are considered typical of industry practice. 
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Figure 2.1 Transmission line protection with maximum practical redun­
dancy 
In [19] the author considers two backup systems. Local Backup System (LBS) and 
a Remote Backup System (RBS). A simplified LBS is shown in Figure 2.3. The main 
protective relay (MPR) contacts close upon fault recognition and pick up contacts 62x 
or 62y in addition to the trip coil (•52T). Relay 50 is an overcurrent relay: the contacts 
remain closed as long as the fault is uncleared, thus allowing coil 62 to energize a timer. 
When the timer completes its cycle, contacts 62 close, energizing the breaker failure 
relay 86. Relay 86 has multiple contacts that initiate tripping on all breakers adjacent 
to the failed system. These breakers adjacent to the failed system are located on the 
same transmission switching station. Faults may be cleared by the LBS without taking 
other lines out of service depending on the transmission switching station arrangement. 
Now consider a protective system strategy for a power system that incorporates 
all three relay systems: the Main Protective System (MPS), the Local Backup System 
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Figure 2.2 Block diagram of typical power system relay and circuit breaker 
control configuration 
(LBS), and the Remote Backup System (RBS). It is further assumed that these systems 
will only fail by operational mode failure, i.e.. failure to operate when called upon to do 
so. 
The three protective systems under consideration will usually have a control config­
uration similar to one of those illustrated in Figure 2.2. Backup systems may be simpler 
than these general arrangements due to the omission of redundant elements. In any 
case, we note the series logic of these systems. The logical pattern is always 
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Figure 2.3 Simplified DC protection schematic for breaker failure and local 
backup protection 
1. instrument transformers and battery 
2. relays 
3. trip coil(s) 
4. breaker mechanism. 
For analysis, we group these components into two groups, a protective relay (electri­
cal) group and a circuit breaker (mechanical) group. Somewhat arbitrarily we include 
1. 2. and 3 in the relay group, and 4 in the circuit breaker group. This simplifies the 
notation for computing reliabilities. 
We now define the event SFC = Successful Fault Clearing and compute the protective 
svstem reliabilitv as 
R  =  P { S F C  (2.1) 
To compute 2.1 we compute the reliability of each subsystem, and combine the 
results. Let MCB stand for main circuit breaker. 
In order to simplify the notation, we write 
IS 
P ^ f p s  =  P ( M  P S  w o r k s )  
P{ M P RivorksandM C Bworfcs) 
PMPRPMCB 
since MPR and MCB are independent systems. 
We also define 
QMPS = P [ M P S f a i l s )  =  \ - P M P S  
QMPR + QMCB — QMPRQMCB (•2.3) 
The LBS and RBS have definitions similar to 2.2 and 2.3. with only the subscripts 
changed. 
To compute the system reliability 2.1. we evaluate the probabilities associated with 
both the local systems and the remote systems. Clearly, one or the other must work 
correctly for successful fault clearing. If we let LPS designate the "local protective 
systems" and RBS the "remote backup systems" we may write 
The LPS consists of both the main protective system and the local backup system. 
Now, the local backup system depends on successful primary relay operation. This gives 
the logic diagram of Figure 2.4. for which we compute 
R  =  P { S F C )  =  P L P S  + PRBS — PLBSPRBS (2.4) 
PLPS = PMPR{PMCB + PLBS — P.MCBPLBS) (2.5) 
where 
PLBS = PLBRPLCB (2 .6)  
19 
LOCAL PnOTECTlVE SYSTEMS 
LBR 
MPR 
RC8 
LCB 
MCB 
Figure 2.4 Logic diagram of successful fault clearing 
and MPR stands for main protective relay. MCB stands for main circuit breaker. LBR 
stands for local backup relay and LCB stands for local circuit breaker. 
Combining 2.5 and 2.6 we compute, after some algebraic manipulation. 
R  = PISFC) = PMPRPMCB + PMPRQMCBPLBS - r  PMPRQMCBQLBSPRBS + QMPRPRBS 
(2.7) 
In some case it is more convenient to work with the probability of system failure. 
i.e.. 
Q  =  I  —  R  =  Q M P R  +  Q M C B Q L B S  —  P M P R Q R B S  
Eq. 2.S gives the probability of unsuccessful fault clearing. 
2.4 Risk in general engineering literature 
The mere act of living involves risk. It is the responsibility of engineers to design, 
build and operate systems that benefit society without significantly increasing risk above 
the inherent everyday risks of life. To achieve this objective it is necessary to quantify 
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and weight the benefit and risk of a variety of systems, from the very simple to the very 
complex, this is achieved via risk analysis. There are several industries that heavily rely 
on risk assessment for decision making, among these are: construction, transportation, 
chemical, nuclear, aerospace and insurance. .A.mong these risk analysis takes a variety 
of names and it has been e.Ktensively discussed in the literature. The following is a 
representative sample of these sources. 
Terje .A.ven [20] presents general methods for analysis of reliability and risk. His book 
focuses on analysis of repairable systems, with most applications taken from offshore 
petroleum activities. 
J.D. .Andrews and T.R. Moss [21] focus on the risk and reliability assessment of 
process plant. It describes the main probabilistic methods employed in reliability and 
risk assessment, particularly fault tree analysis and failure mode and effect analysis and 
their derivatives. 
Richard B. Jones [22] presents techniques to achieve risk reduction, "an industrial-
strength version of continuous improvement". His risk-based management is based on 
reliability-centered maintenance (RCM). RCM's fundamental premise is to maintain 
system function by analyzing how a system functions and how it can functionally fail. 
2.5 Summary 
Our work is oriented toward power systems security and operations. This orientation 
allow us to represent the precontingency operating conditions deterministically. since it is 
precisely those conditions that an operator must know when assessing risk in real time. It 
also requires that we compute risk as a function of precontingency operating conditions. 
The vast majority of previous efforts have been concerned with planning and adequacy 
and most contemporary reliability assessment methods are limited to static (power flow) 
assessments. There is a clear need for methods and indices to evaluate system reliability 
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at the operations level, i.e.. to perform probabilistic security assessment. Previous work 
that dealt with probabilistic security or stability faced one or more of the following 
problems: 
• They required an e.\tensive amount of statistical data, data that was normally 
unavailable to practitioners. Several previously developed methods assume that a 
certain amount and type of statistical data was a\^ilable or "could be obtained" 
and then proceeded to develop methods based on these presumably available data. 
Our method uses a minimum amount of statistical data, the frequency of faults 
and their type on a circuit, data known to be available to most utilities. 
• They used clearing time being less than critical clearing time as stability perfor­
mance measure, this measure may provide practical and valuable upper bounds 
on limits as well as insight into the behavior of a system, but its application to 
real systems is limited since clearing time is fixed by protection systems set-up. 
For the transient stability problem our system performance measure is a compos­
ite evaluation of stability limits for all fault types and locations calculated using 
time-domain simulation. For the thermal overload problem our system perfor­
mance measure is whether or not the-post contingency flow on the circuit at risk 
of thermal overload exceeds its short-time emergency rating. 
• .Analytical structures to calculate probability of instability or insecurity were pre­
sented but Monte Carlo, or other numerical methods, were used to actually cal­
culate the desired probability. We present a simple method that is tractable 
thus avoiding the need of calculating probabilities using computationally inten­
sive methods. 
.•\lso. previous work on probabilistic stability assessment differs from our work in 
that our purpose of calculating probability of instability is to use it with the impact of 
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instability, i.e. to calculate risk of operating at a specific operating point. Calculating 
probability of instability is only one step towards the use of risk as a decision making 
tool, a management tool. 
Calculating probability of instability is an interesting problem that once solved pro­
vides us with little information on how to evaluate the operating conditions associated 
with this probability. For example, knowing that the probability of instability over the 
next hour is 0.7-5 may lead to operating decisions to reduce this high probability of insta­
bility condition, but is this a sound economic decision ? Is the cost of operating at this 
high probability of instability condition greater than the benefit ? Probability alone can 
not answer this question. .Accounting for impact of instability leads to the development 
of a concise statement of the security-economics tradeoff problem. 
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3 RISK OF INSECURITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Our goal is to determine operating limits based on the risk of insecurity at a given 
operating point. In this chapter we show how to quantify this risk. We characterize the 
operating point in terms of pre-contingency controllable parameters, the critical parame­
ter set. that most influence the postcontingency system performance. In general, several 
parameters will influence the postcontingency system performance: thus the operating 
point should be characterized in terms of all these. For the transient stability problem 
we simplify the analysis using only one parameter in our critical parameter set. real 
power generation on the machines at risk of losing synchronism. Thermal overloads are 
characterized by pre-contingency flows on the circuits that are at risk of overloading and 
generation changes that affect the post-contingency flows on such circuits. 
We use R{-^t) to represent the risk at operating point where we use the subscript t 
to emphasize the time dependence of the operating point. At any given operating point 
we may have a security violation j due to a fault on line i Total risk at a given 
operating point is obtained summing over all defined security violations and their 
corresponding triggering events. 
= (3.1) 
V J Vi' 
'We cissume that the elementary event that triggers a security violation is a fault on circuit /. this 
may be generalized to "malfunction of component T to include other possible ways of initiating a 
security violation. 
24 
As mentioned in chapter one risk is the product of probability and impact, thus 
Rji{st) = Pjiist)Ijiist). We assume that the impact of a security violation is known 
or that a good estimate is arailable. The following section presents how to obtain the 
probabilities needed to calculate risk. 
3.2 Probability of security violations 
In this work we consider two security violations, transient instability and thermal 
overload. We use probability theory to develop two approaches for computing proba­
bility of transient instability and a simpler approach to compute probability of thermal 
overload ". W'e present the concept of limiting operating point functions, curves that 
characterize the dependency of operating limits on fault type and location, and we use 
these curves to compute probability of instability. 
3.2.1 Assumptions, definitions and notation 
We wish to determine the probability of insecurity j due to a fault on circuit / at 
operating point St over the next hour. To simplify the discussion we restrict the problem 
with the assumptions below: however, the theory developed in this chapter is fle.xible 
enough to allow these assumptions to be lifted if desired. In fact, we consider the effect 
of lifting assumptions 1 and 2. i.e. the effect of unreliability of protection equipment 
later in this chapter. 
1. Every sustained fault on transmission circuit i will be followed by fault clearing, 
i.e.. line outage. This implies that we do not accoimt for momentary faults which 
do not result in line clearing nor do we account for a stuck breaker condition. 
"It is possible to define the event of interest to be "economic impact" and use the probability of this 
event to assess risk, since the economic impact event can not occur without occurrence of the security 
violation. This alternative definition of the event of interest allows risk evaluation of remedial action 
schemes where successful operation of the equipment results in controlled economic impact. 
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2. Everv fault clearing is preceded by a sustained fault: therefore we do not account 
for breaker misoperation. 
3. A fault may occur anywhere on a line with the same probability of occurrence. 
Let k'j denote the event insecurity j. P ( K j )  denotes the probability of this event. 
Let Fi denote the event fault on transmission circuit i over the next hour. P{Fi) denotes 
the probability of the event fault on transmission circuit i over the next hour. 
Occurrence of Fi does not imply that insecurity j will occur, e.g.. an outage on the 
line from bus 10 to bus 20 will cause rotor angle instability on a nearby machine .A. 
only if operating point St for machine .A is beyond the limiting operating point for that 
outage. In generaL the probability of insecurity j due to fault on line i at operating 
point .•>[ is the product of the probability of fault on line / at operating point and the 
conditional probability of insecurity J given a fault occurs at operating point .'i,. i.e. 
P ( h ) )  =  P ( F ,  n S ) ) P ( A - , / F  n S , )  (3.2) 
St represents the event "operating point 5f". The subscript t refers to a given time, 
the time at which w-e are e\aluating system security. In this work we consider two 
security violations: transient instability and thermal overload. We use what we call the 
Law of Total Probability approach and the Cartesian product approach to calculate the 
conditional probability of instability given a fault occurs. We assume that instability J 
may only occur due to an outage of a transmission circuit. We use an indicator function 
to calculate the conditional probability of thermal overload given a fault occurs. The 
following sections explain these methods. 
3.2.2 Law of Total Probability approach 
Our goal is to compute risk corresponding to a specific operating point therefore 
and P(S't = .St) = I. .Assume that having a fault on circuit i is independent of 
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the system operating point. Thus. 
P(F,n5,) = P [ F i ) P { S t )  =  P { F . )  (3.3) 
We define 3o. 2o. and lo to ground faults to be the set of all possible faults.^ and we 
assume that only one of these faults occur at a time. Let events ai- a2 and «3 represent 
single phase to ground fault, two phase to ground fault and three phase to ground fault, 
respectively. This constitutes a collection of mutually e.vclusive and e.xhaustive events. 
Therefore, starting with the identity Fi = Fi fl F,. 
F ,  = F,-n (03 U a-i U ai) 
P ( F . )  =  P { F . n a : , )  +  P { F i n a o )  +  P { F n a i )  (3.4) 
From the above and the definition of conditional probability [23. pp. IS] we can 
derive the probability of instability j due to a fault on circuit i at operating point 
n , r ' , n s  ^  P i  F ,  D  )  
m.M) = 
En=i P(F, na„)P(/\j/F, na„) 
P ( F i )  
i 
= ^ P(an/F.)P(Aj7F, n a„) (3.5) 
n=l 
Let £ be a continuous random variable, denoting fault location on a line and let L  be 
the line length. The uniform probability density function (uniform pdf) indicates that 
all locations on line i have equal probability of sustaining a fault given a fault occurs. 
^Tlie severity of line to line faults on transient instability typically lies between 2o to ground faults 
and lo to ground faults. If the probability of occurrence of line to line faults is comparable to the 
probability of 3o. 2o. and lo to ground faults then line to line faults must be included in the set of all 
possible faults. This can be done with no loss of generality. 
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The pdf is given by 
f { l : O . L )  =  J  .  0 < l  < L  
= 0 . otherwise (3.6) 
If we let / = - «'here is the length of circuit i for which an no fault results 
in instability j at operating point Sf then 
gives the probability of instability j given an no fault occurs on circuit i. The integration 
path is taken over the portion of circuit i length for which an no fault results in instability 
j at operating point If this portion of circuit i consists of two or more non-consecutive 
segments, then Eq. 3.7 must be interpreted as a sum of integrals, one for each segment. 
The probability of the event occurrence of a no fault given a fault occurs on line i 
at operating point itf over the next hour. P{anfFi) is obtained from historical data. 
3.2.2.1 Length of circuit i for which an no fault results in instability, 
The parameter indicates the length of circuit i for which an no fault results 
in unstable response. 
If the generation level is at or below its deterministic limit (e.g.. the ma.Kimum 
generation level for which the generator response is stable for a 3o at the machine 
terminals), then ljis^.az = 0- implying that the generator response is stable for a 3o fault 
located anywhere on the line. In this case, we would e.xpect Ijis,.n2 = ljist.ai = 0. also. 
.A.t some generation level above the deterministic limit, however, it would be true that 
ljis,.a3. ^ implying that the generator response is unstable for a 3o fault located within 
a distance x from the generator terminals. .-Vt the generation level where = J". 
(3.7) 
2S 
0 > > -r and 0 > ljis,.ai > -i" depending on exxitation system type and x. i.e.. 
single phase to ground and double phase to ground faults may or may not be stable for 
faults closer to the generator terminals than x depending on the e.xcitation system used 
on the machine at risk of losing synchronism and fault location. 
3.2.3 Cartesian product approach 
One difference in the Cartesian approach relative to the Law of Total Probability 
approach is that we discretize the inherently continuous random triable fault location. 
This step, and the notion of independence, allow us to use a Cartesian product to easily 
combine the pdf for fault type and pdf for fault location into one joint pdf. The joint 
pdf for fault type and location is used to assess the conditional probability of instability 
j given a fault on line i occurs. We use the limiting operating point functions to do this 
assessment. 
3.2.3.1 Limiting operating point functions 
It is possible to obtain data characterizing the dependency of operating limit on 
fault type and location by using time domain simulation or other techniques to find the 
limiting values of the critical parameter for various fault locations on the line. We call 
the resulting functions the limiting operating point functions. 
For a transient instability problem the limiting generation level for a 3o fault would 
be likely to increase as the fault is moved away from the bus closest to the machine at 
risk of losing synchronism, or as the fault is changed from a 3o fault to a 20 or a lo 
fault, because these changes cause the impedance seen by the fault to increase. Limiting 
operating functions showing the previously discussed behavior are illustrated in Figure 
3.1. In Chapter 4 we show how excitation system types, network topology and sequence 
impedances can influence the limiting operating point functions. 
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Figure 3.1 Limiting operating point functions 
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3.2.3.2 Relation between the length of circuit / for which an no fault 
results in instability, and limiting operating point functions 
Given any [fault type, fault location] pair on circuit i we can always obtain a limiting 
value for the critical parameter, generation level in this case, but there is no guarantee 
that there is a [fault type, fault location] pair for which a given generation level is a 
limit. Therefore, it is necessary to choose the [fault type, fault location pair] and use 
time domain simulation, or other techniques, to obtain the corresponding unique value 
of the critical parameter. This is how we generate the limiting operating point functions. 
If there are operating points for which a fault located at a point on the line could 
result in more severe stability performance than that of a fault closer to the generator 
terminals, then the limiting operating point functions are not monotonically increasing. 
In this case there are some operating points for which the integration path in Eq. 3.7 
consists of more than one consecutive segment; we use the following procedure to obtain 
'jiit.an from the limiting operating point functions. 
1. Draw a horizontal line corresponding to the current operating point on the 
limiting operating point vs. fault location plane. 
2. Identify the segments of circuit / associated with values of the limiting operating 
points below the horizontal line drawn in step I. 
3. The sum of the segment lengths identified in step 2 is equal to 
This procedure also applies if stability performance always improves as the fault 
moves further along the line from the generator terminals so that the limiting operating 
point functions are monotonically increasing. In this case the integration path in Eq. 
3.7 consists of a single segment. 
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3.2.3.3 Conditional probability of instability 
We use the limiting operating point functions to calculate P(k'j). the probability 
of instability j. If a [fault type, fault location] pair occurs which requires an operating 
limit for stability less than the system will be unstable. In other words. P(l\j) is the 
probability of occurrence of faults on circuit i over the ne.Kt hour for which the current 
operating point is beyond the operating limit for stability required by these faults. 
The conditional probability of the event instability j given a fault on line i occurs is 
P [ K jI F , ]  =  P { P U M , X n . L )  < s,). (3.S) 
Equation 3.S indicates that Pumj,- the stability limit for certain [fault type, fault 
location] pair on a given circuit i over the next hour, is a random variable. 
depends on / and n. the discretized random variables corresponding to fault location 
and fault type, respectively"*. 
3.2.3.4 Probability density function for fault type 
Let A be the fault type sample space, i.e.. the set of all possible fault types. A is 
a countable set with elementary events cii. cii and 03 (single phase to ground fault, two 
phase to ground fault and three phase to ground fault, respectively). Let A' be the 
discrete random variable for fault type and let n be the integer values it may take. We 
denote the pdf for fault type as /„(n) and show its graph in Figure 3.2. 
3.2.3.5 Probability density function for fault location 
Let B be the fault location sample space, i.e.. the set of all possible fault locations, 
is a countable set with elementary events 60. 61 
•'The random %'ariable n is inherently discrete. The random variable I is inherently continuous but 
we discretized to obtain the joint pdf. 
'4"i 
1 . -
o Q. 
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Figure 3.2 Probability density function for fault type f n { n ]  
W'e assume that a fault may occur anywhere on the line with the same probability, 
therefore, we use a discrete uniform distribution function to model fault location. 
Discrete uniform distribution: .4 discrete random variable X has the discrete uni­
form distribution on the integers 0. I. J M if it has a pdf of the form 
for X = 0. 1.2 M. 
Let C be the discrete random variable for fault location and let / be the integer values 
it may take. We denote the pdf for fault location as /((/) and show its graph in Figure 
3.3. Each interval in Figure 3.3 has length LIM. 
3.2.3.6 Joint PDF and Cartesian products 
We assume the events fault type and fault location to be independent events. Physi­
cally we mean that any type of fault may occur anywhere on a transmission line. Prob­
abilistically we mean that £ = / and A = n are independent [24. pp. 31]. i.e.. 
P { C  =  L . X  = n) = P{C = L)P{\ '  = n). (3.10) 
V" 
1 - -
°  1 / (M +  1 )  -  -
J3 O 
0  1  2  3  •  •  •  M  
f a u l t  l o c a t i o n  
Figure 3.3 Probability density function for fault location /;(/) 
In this definition, the events a„ and 6/ are subsets of the same probability space. S. 
We defined A as the fault type sample space and B as the fault location sample space. 
To satisfy the probability definition of independence we construct a space S having as 
subsets the sets A and B using the Cartesian product of these sets. 
Cartesian products [24, pp. 38]: Given two sets A and B with elements cii and bi 
respectively, we form all ordered pairs [a,, bi] where a, any element of A. and bi is 
any element of B. The Cartesian product of the sets A and B is a set S whose elements 
are all such pairs. 
The space S is shown in Figure 3.4-B. If the events fault type and fault location are 
independent events the joint pdf of these events is the product of their individual pdf: 
i.e. fn.i{ n . l )  =  fn{ n ) f i { l ) .  
Figure 3.4 shows the relation between the space S and the limiting operating point 
functions. The points on the limiting operating point functions which are less than the 
white points in Figure 3.4-A. are those points associated with [fault type, fault location] 
pairs which cause instability. Identification of these pairs results in identification of the 
region D on the probability space S. the white points in Figure 3.4-B. This region D 
includes all fault type and fault location combinations which make Pumj, < implying 
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Figure 3.4 Relation between limiting operating point functions and the 
space S 
that operating point would result in instability if any of these [fault type, fault location] 
pairs occur. 
This relation suggests the following procedure to calculate P[l\jlF,) using the lim­
iting operating point functions: 
1. Draw a horizontal line corresponding to the current operating point on the 
limiting operating point vs. fault location plane. 
2. Identify the [fault type, fault location] pairs associated with values of the limiting 
operating points below the horizontal line drawn in step 1. 
3. Calculate and add the probability of occurrence of these pairs using the joint pdf 
f o r  f a u l t  t y p e  a n d  f a u l t  l o c a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  n u m e r i c a l l y  e q u a l  t o  P { K j f  F , ) .  
The probability of rotor angle instability. P { K j ] .  due to a fault on line i  at over 
the next hour is 
P(/vj) = P { F i )PlPum„{n.l] < St) (3.11) 
3.2.4 Probability of occurrence of a fault on line i 
Transient instability or thermal overload normally occur as the result of an initiating 
event that induces a disturbance in the system. We assume this initiating event to be 
a fault on line i and use a Poisson process to model its probability of occurrence". In 
this section we describe the Homogeneous. Xon-Homogeneous and Compound Poisson 
processes. 
3.2.4.1 Homogeneous Poisson process 
We assume that we have historical data which provides the number of outages per 
unit of time and. following traditional security assessment practices, assume noncredible 
events to have probability equal to zero. We relate the rate of occurrence of event i to 
the probability of occurrence of event i using a homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) [23. 
pp. lOo]. Let X(t) ^ denote the number of events that occur in a given interval [0./]. 
and suppose that the following additional assumptions hold. 
• Stationary increments: The probability that an event will occur in a given short in­
terval [/. / + Af] is appro.ximately proportional to the length of the interval. St. and 
^Other models, such as .Markov processes, may be suitable also. For instance, limits, characterized 
by operating parameters, are associated with a given topological state of the system: when the state 
changes, new limits are used [25]. .Assuming that the topological state of the system is known with 
probability equal to one and assuming noncredible events have probability zero the probability of state 
transition from one state to the next is equal to the probability of occurrence of the event. 
"Xit) is. in general, a counting process since .V(0 represents the total number of "events" that have 
occurred up to time t [26. pp. 208]. 
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does not depend on the position of the inten^l. This means that the probability 
of occurrence of an event in an inter\'al increases as the interval increases. 
• Independent increments: The occurrences of events in non-overlapping inter\-als' 
are independent. 
• Xegligible multiple events: The probability of occurrence of two or more indepen­
dent events in a short interx'al [f. f -f A^j is negligible. 
The probability of occurrence of r events in a given interval [t.t 4- Af] is. 
Using Eq. 3.12 and recalling that F, is the event one line outage on transmission 
circuit i over the next hour® we obtain the probability of one outage on transmission 
circuit i over the ne.Kt hour (r=l./=l). 
The proportionality constant A,- reflects the rate of occurrence or intensity of the Poisson 
process, and it may be estimated using the sample mean [23. pp. 571] of the observed 
number of outages over the number of observation intervals. 
3.2.4.2 Non-homogeneous Poisson process 
.A. non-homogeneous, also called non-stationary. Poisson process is obtained by al­
lowing the arrival rate, the rate of occurrence, at time ^ to be a function of time [26. pp. 
237]. If we let m{t) = /d X(s)ds. then it can be shown that 
'Non-overlapping intervals are intervals that do not share any points, in this case time points. 
'^We compute risk off-line and compare the relative risk of different candidate limits. We may use 
any time interval to calculate probabilities as long as we are consistent at the moment of comparing 
risks. We choose a time period of one hour to be consistent with the fact that the operating conditions 
for which we are calculating risk are not likely to e.vist past one hour. If we were to compare risk vs. 
benefits we will also need to use consistent time periods when calculating risks and benefits. 
f  A / K  P(A'(0 = r) = ^.r = 0.1 A > 0 
r! 
(3.12) 
P [ F i )  = A.e-'-.A, > 0 (3.13) 
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P { X ( t + s )  -  X ( t )  =  r ) =  + r > 0 (3.14) 
In other words. X { t + s )  —  X ( t )  is Poisson distributed with mean m { t ^ 6 )  —  m { t ) .  Thus 
X{t) is Poisson distributed with mean m{t). and for this reason m(t) is called the mean 
value function of the process. The importance of the non-homogeneous Poisson process 
resides in the fact that we no longer require the condition of stationary increments. Thus 
we now allow for the possibility that events may be more likely to occur during certain 
time periods. We may use this model to conveniently account for the non-uniformity 
of outage rates, i.e.. let A(/) v^ary with season and weather. For example, an area that 
e.xpects to be hit by a hurricane may choose to use an intensity function X{t) given by 
A(0 = a  +  b t  .  0 > t > t i  
=  C  •  t i > t  > t 2  
=  c - b t  .  t 2 > t > t 3  (3.15) 
where the parameters a.b.c and times depend on hurricane trajectory and speed. 
3.2.4.3 Compound Poisson process 
.A stochastic process Z { t ) . t  > 0 is said to be a compound Poisson process if it can be 
represented as 
.V(f) 
Z ( t )  =  Y , y ] . t > 0  (3.16) 
1=1 
where X { t ) . t  > 0 is a Poisson process, and > 0 is a family of independent and 
identically distributed random variables which are also independent of > 0. 
38 
Suppose several lines emanate from a generating station and a modei for the total 
number of line outages over time is required. If we assume that data is available on the 
number of outages on line i and a Poisson process X{t) may be used to model the event 
l i n e  o u t a g e  t h e n  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  l i n e  o u t a g e s  f o r  a l l  t h e  l i n e s  i s  g i v e n  b y  Z ( t ) .  I f  w e  
let X{t) be a non-homogeneous Poisson process then Z{t) becomes a non-homogeneous 
compound Poisson process. 
3.2.5 An indicator function to calculate probability of thermal overload 
The conditional probability of thermal overload depends on pre-contingency flows 
on the circuits that are at risk of overloading, the monitored circuits, and generation 
changes that affect the post-contingency flows on such circuits, but it does not depend 
on the type of fault or fault location. We will have thermal overload with probability 
equal to unity if the post-contingency flow on the monitored line. /. is above its short 
term emergency (STE) rating. 
Pik'j/F,) = 0 . /<STE 
=  I  .  / >  S T E  (3.17) 
It is interesting to note that the STE can be expressed as a probabilistic function of 
weather statistics, but doing so is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
3.3 Impact of insecurity 
Significant interest exists in assessing the impact of disturbances resulting in violation 
of reliability criteria in bulk transmission systems. Quantification of the cost of system 
disturbances and using these impacts in computing risks associated with an operation 
point is an important aspect of the risk-based security assessment method since it links 
the operating limits with the costs of the disturbances that affect the operating limit. 
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3.3.1 Quantification of impact of instability 
The impact of security violation j due to event i at operating point can be expressed 
as 
+  ^ T j i { S t )  +  I D j i i S f )  
where fSjiisi) is the impact on the suppliers (mainly replacement energy costs and cost 
of resynchronization). ITji{st) is the impact on the owner of the transmission facilities 
affected by the security violation (costs to repair equipment and reenergize facilities), 
and [Dji{st) is the impact on the demand served by the affected suppliers (replacement 
energy costs and/or cost of service interruption). This formulation is attractive because 
it facilitates identification of tvho is taking risk and how much when "no-risk" operating 
limits are e.Kceeded. This identification will become more critical as the electric power 
industry undergoes organizational separation based on function^. The ultimate goal is 
to develop methods of expressing these impact components in dollars. 
The costs associated with the impact on supply and transmission can be quanti­
fied. as associated techniques and data are usually available. Quantitative assessment 
of other costs, however, such as those associated with the impact on the demand or 
those associated with regulatory actions precipitated by nuclear generation trip or load 
interruption can be difficult to do with precision because these costs are dispersed and 
e.Ktremely variable, and in some cases, historical data is either not av'ailable or hard to 
gather [27. 2S]. .A. simple, subjective method of evaluating these impacts is to assign 
to each consequence a discrete level (like i.2.3) corresponding to the severity [29j. For 
e.vample. a logarithmic scale could be developed where one could assign to each demand 
^The 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policy .A.ct (PURP.A.) provided for non-utility generation, and 
the 1992 National Energ}' Policy .\ct required that utilities provide transmission service at a fair price to 
any generation owner wishing to sell on the wholesale energy market. Currently, many state legislatures 
are considering e.\tending this requirement to include retail energy sales as well. Thus, traditional rate-
base regulation of the utilities is giving way to a competitive, multi-participant bulk power market, 
and organizational separation seems likely in order to ensure no competitive participant can utilize the 
market power inherent to operation of the transmission system. 
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impact a discrete impact level a between 0 and '20. such that an increase in a of i 
indicates an increase in dollar impact by a factor of 10. The dollar impact is then lO''. 
This is attractive because although it can be difBcult to subjectively estimate impact 
in terms of absolute dollar values, it is usually not difficult to estimate relative differ­
ences between various impacts in terms of orders of magnitude. For instance, in [25] 
impact factors are used to account for socio/political costs, costs that are included as 
a percentage increase over the energy- replacement costs. The socio/political weighting 
factors are based on subjective assessment and are appro.ximate. but the point is that 
they represent real impacts having effects that must be included in risk calculation. 
To better quantify economic impact more data is required, particularly for security 
violations such as oscillatory instability, voltage instability and thermal overloads. .A. 
survey has been recently developed [30] to extract information from a large number of 
industry experts regarding the economic impact of various system instabilities. This 
survey will quantify the economic cost impact of bulk transmission disturbances to the 
various owners of power system facilities. 
3.3.1.1 Impact approximations used in this dissertation 
In Chapter o we use a modified version of the IEEE Reliability Test System to illus­
trate risk-based electric power system security assessment. In this example we consider 
transient instability and thermal overload to be the only security violations of interest. 
We account for the impact of these security violations using estimates of the economic 
consequences of suffering such violations. 
In the event of transient instability it is estimated that a generation plant consisting 
of three 3-50 -\I\\ units would be out of service for 10 hours. We assume that energy 
can be replaced at a cost of 37.5 S/MWh'''. startup fixed costs are estimated at §45.000 
'"The average sale for resale revenue per kWh in 1994 was 3.7 cents according to "The Electric 
Power .\nnual 1994 \blume II Operational and Financial Data" a report from the Energy Information 
Administration. 
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for all three machines and maintenance and repairs costs are estimated at S36.22o for 
all three machines". These costs are direct costs to the energy producer, we assume 
that no load is shed due to this outage, thus there are no direct or indirect costs to the 
customer. 
The impact of thermal overload is divided into maximum and partial impact. Max­
imum impact refers to the total cost of reconductoring the line, this is needed when the 
flow on the line e.Kceeds short-time emergency rating. Maximum impact is estimated 
at SlOS.OOO per mile^^. .Appendix 2 includes material and construction costs data from 
ComEd and PG^cE. Partial impact is the impact of thermal overload for flows above 
continuous rating and below short-time emergency rating. Partial impact is assumed, for 
simplicity, to follow a linear curve^^ as shown in Figure 3.5. a maximum partial impact 
of one third the total cost of reconductoring the line is assumed to generate the impact 
vs. limiting parameter curve. This figure is arbitrary, the point being that there is a 
deterioration on the line that must be accounted for when flows are above continuous 
rating and below short-time emergency rating. 
3.4 Risk expressions 
This section summarizes how we obtain expressions that allow quantification of the 
risk of operating at a given operating point as a function of those pre-contingency pa­
rameters (the cntical parameter set) that most influence the postcontingency system 
performance. We present risk expressions that consider (1) fully reliable conventional 
protection systems and (2) unreliability of conventional protection systems. 
^'Maintenance costs are estimated at 3.45 Miils/kWli according to data from "Energy Information 
Administration/Historical Plant Cost and .Annual Production E.\penses for Selected Electric Plants 
1987". Startup costs are estimates from actual data confidentially supplied by a utility. 
'"This estimate includes conductor and tower work only. The estimate is guided by a 1992 Common­
wealth Edison Company. Chicago IL. reconductoring project. 
'^This implies a linear deterioration of the line as the .\IV.A flow increases. 
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Figure 3.5 Thermal overload impact as a function of M\'A flow for the line 
between Buses 13 and 12. modified RTS-96 
3.4.1 Risk assuming fully reliable protection system 
If we assume that a fault on circuit i  is always cleared by the main protection system 
the risk of operating at operating point is: 
P{Fi )P[S ,  =  s , )P(Kj /F ,  n 5, = s , ) I [Kj /F i  n5, = s , )  (;{.18) 
In Eq. 3.IS St = because the event operating point is not random, it is known. 
Our expression calculates risk of a given, deterministic, operating point. If we were 
calculating risk for a random operating point, as we will do in planning, then the left 
h a n d  s i d e  o f  E q .  3 . I S  w i l l  b e  R ( S t ) :  r i s k  w i l l  b e  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  r a n d o m  v a r i a b l e  S i  
instead of iSf, 
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3.4.2 Effect of conventional system protection reliability on risk 
Consideration of the rehability of conventional system protection requires identifi­
cation and assessment of the different impacts that an elementary event, a fault on 
circuit / in this case, may have. We desire a risk expression that integrates reliability 
of system protection with risk-based security assessment. VV'e use the probability of sat­
isfactory or unsatisfactory performance of conventional system protection and consider 
three conditions following a fault on line i with different impacts: 
1. fault occurs on circuit /. and it is cleared by the main protection mechanism, i.e.. 
Fi n .\/ n 5'r 
2. fault occurs on circuit i .  the main protection mechanism fails to clear the fault (this 
is an active failure), and the fault is cleared by the backup protection mechanism 
F, n .\7 n 5 n 
3. no fault occurs, circuit i  is lost due to undesired operation of the protection system 
(this is a passive failure) F, fl Mq fl S't 
where M denotes main protection mechanism works. M denotes main protection mech­
anism fails due to active failure. .\/o denotes main protection mechanism fails due to 
passive failure. B denotes backup protection works. F, denotes undesired operation of 
the protection system and 5, denotes system is operating at operating point Then 
the risk at operating point is given by; 
= Y. n .u n S , ) [ (Kj /F i  n M n 5,) 
f j  V i  
P(F , )P{ . \ I )P{B)P(S: )P{h ' j /F i  n . \ i  n s n 5t)/(Kj /Fi  n .u n B n 5,) 
+ P(Fi)P(.\lQ]P{S,)P{Kj/Fi n M n S:)I{I<j/Fi n Mo D 5,)] (3.19) 
In all cases the conditional probabilities of insecurity are obtained using the set of 
limiting operating point functions that correspond to the conditions following the fault 
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on line i .  
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter we provide a foundation to calculate probability of insecurity from 
which the risk-based security assessment approach for determining operating limits may 
be extended. 
Two approaches have been presented for computing probability of instability: one is 
based on Law of Total Probability and the other on Cartesian products. Both approaches 
use the same basic data and result in the same probability \-alues: however, the Law of 
Total Probability approach does not require independence between the fault type and 
fault location events. 
We use an indicator function to obtain the conditional probability of insecurity given 
a fault occurs for thermal overloads. 
Finally, we present expressions to calculate the risk associated with a given oper­
ating point considering fully reliable conventional protection systems and unreliable 
conventional protection systems pro\'iding a unified framework for identif\-ing operating 
points that equitably balance risk with operating costs. 
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4 LIMITING OPERATING POINT FUNCTIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
We show that the limiting operating point functions introduced in Chapter 3 cannot 
be expressed in closed form. We attempted to express the limiting parameter, generation 
in this case, as a function of fault type and location and tried two different approaches, 
using an expression from the transient energy function (TEF) and a simple one-machine 
to infinite bus using the equal area criterion. Because TEF requires angles and speeds 
at fault clearing the approach proved infeasible since these angles and speeds may only 
be obtained via numerical integration and are not available in closed form. The one-
machine to infinite bus using the equal area criterion results in an e.xpression that requires 
an iterative solution and it does not serve the need of identifying basic factors which 
influence the limiting operating point functions. 
We used time domain simulation to study variation of limiting operating point func­
tions with fault location and fault type on a simple test system, a 500 k\' system local 
to the Xavajo Power Plant in .Arizona. We show how excitation system types, network 
topology and sec[uence impedances can influence the limiting operating point functions. 
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4.2 Investigation of analytical expressions for limiting operat­
ing point functions 
Our goal in developing a closed form expression for these functions is not to use it 
in calculation, since considerable modeling simplification is necessary, but to illuminate 
the basic properties of the limiting operating point functions. 
4.2.1 Analytical expression using Transient Energy Function (TEF) 
The limiting operating point curves (lopc) are graphs of limiting parameters, e.g.. 
generation level at a specific machine or machines or real power flow over a set of lines, 
vs. fault location. The limiting parameter is a pre-disturbance observable parameter. 
Each point in the lopc is the ma.ximum level that the parameter may reach for stability 
in the event of having a specific type of fault at a given location. Conceptually each 
point in the lopc corresponds to a disturbance scenario with a normalized energy margin 
of zero. „ =0 [31. pp. S6]. 
Av;  =  o=  -  (4 .1 )  
1=1 
n —I n gu gel ^ ffu gel 
-  Y .  [Ci j icosO^j  -  cosBf j )  -  D,J-— '  _ ' i—-[s ine t j  -  -s /n f l f j ) ]  
1=1 j=,+ l 
where are the conditions at the end of the disturbance and (0".O) represents 
the controlling unstable equilibrium point. A I ), = 0 is in terms of post-disturbance 
equilibrium parameters, i.e.. A\ ,i(0'"''.>I''-''.5"). Of these. 0"^' and I.'""' are functions of fault 
attributes and pre-disturbance parameters, i.e.. Pum)- Pum). where n, /. 
and Piim denote fault type, fault location and limiting parameter (e.g. generation level), 
respectively. The connection between these post-disturbance parameters and the 
pre-disturbance operating parameters {n . l .  Pum)  is obtained via numerical integration of 
the system equations, i.e.. time domain simulation. There is no simple analytical, closed-
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Figure 4.1 One machine connected to an infinite bus through two transmis­
sion h'nes (A) one-line diagram. (B) equivalent circuit. 
form connection between pre-disturbance conditions and post-disturbance parameters in 
TEF or any other direct stability assessment method. 
We conclude that development of an analytical expression using TEF cannot be 
done without obtaining a relationship between pre-disturbance conditions and end-of-
disturbance conditions. 
4.2.2 Analytical expression using equal area criterion 
We e.xplored the possibility of developing an analytical expression for the lopf us­
ing a simple one-machine-infinite-bus system. Here we attempted to use the generator 
classical model and equal area criterion [32. pp.26-33] to link fault reactance (due to an 
specific fault type, fault location pair) and maximum pre-disturbance generation level 
(the limiting parameter of the lope in this case). 
Figure 4.1 shows a system where one machine is connected to an infinite bus through 
two transmission lines. From network theory we can show that the power at node 1 is 
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given by 
Pi = E'Y\icos(dii) + EVY\2sin{S — O12 + —) (4.2) 
where all symbols are defined as in [32. pp. 27]. The swing equation for the generator is 
— ^  = Pm-Pi (4.3) 
at -
where Pm is mechanical power input to the generator. .A.ny fault anywhere on this circuit 
will be represented in this mathematical model via Y'nldvi. the negative of the transfer 
admittance, -yn- between nodes 1 and 2 resulting from the fault also changes). 
Since fault clearing time is fi.xed Pi will be a limiting generation. Pi = P/,m = Pm- if 
S{t = tclearing) = ^critical- = tdeartng) IS obtained integrating the swing equation from 
;=0 (when the fault is applied) to t  =  tciea .rmg =  ic-
~  ^  J q  +  E \  \ i 2 f s i n ( 5 { t )  —  0 i 2 f  + (4.4) 
and S^ri t icai  is given by the equal area criterion [32. pp. 31]. 
1 Pm - -
Scr i t i ca l  = arCCOs( [( -?5^)(<^'m " (^ 'o ) + ''2 COS - t ' l  COS ^q] ) (4.5) 
' '2 - ''1 P.\/ 
where 
• P.M = peak of the prefault power-angle curve (P\/ = EVY' i z )  
• ri = ratio of the peak of the power-angle curve of the faulted network to P\/ 
• r2 = ratio of the peak of the power-angle curve of the network with the fault 
cleared to Pv/ 
• <Jo = arcsin(-^) = arcsin(^^) 
• 6m = arcsin(;^) = arcsin(;^). 
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The relation between fault type and location (given by ^-'u/Z^n/ and >12/^^12/) and 
predisturbance limit (generation level Pi = Pm = Pum) is. 
arccos( (•) — + roCOsSml-) — '•t(-) cosdo{-)]) (4.6) 
'•2-ri(-) Pu 
= ^ Pi imt :  - ^  [ [  £"^V ' i i cos (0 i i )  +  EVYi2 fs in{S( t )  -  Oioj  +  ' i r )d td t  
2n In  Jo Jo  -
where the notation is used to emphasize the dependence of these pa­
rameters on Plim- The only practical way of solving Eq. 4.6 to find Pu^ in terms of 
^11/^^11/ and Vi2/Z^i2/ is numerically. This defeats the purpose of having a closed form 
relation between fault type and location and limiting parameter. 
4.3 Time domain simulation study of the limiting operating 
point functions 
The limiting operating point functions characterize the dependency of operating limit 
on fault type and location by using time domain simulation to find the limiting values 
of the critical parameter for various fault locations on the line. 
We have developed probability of instability in terms of the limiting operating point 
functions. These functions are critical to the assessment procedure because embedded 
within them is information on operating point, probability, and stability performance. 
Our investigation indicates that these functions are influenced by 
• sequence impedances seen from the fault point for unbalanced faults 
• excitation system type for the "at risk" generator, and 
• network topology. 
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4.4 Study system and analysis of results 
Simulation studies were performed on a simple test system, a 500 k\" system local to 
the Xa\^jo Power Plant in Arizona, to illustrate how excitation system types, network 
topology and sequence impedances can influence the limiting operating point functions. 
.A. one line diagram of the study system and the system data are given in .Appendi-X .-V. The 
system configuration represents the Navajo-McCuIlough 500 kV line out of service due to 
either forced or scheduled outage. It is assumed that there is no series compensation in 
the Xavajo-Westwing. .Vavajo-Moenkopi. Moenkopi-Westwing. and Moenkopi-Eldorado 
500 k\' lines. Generators in the study area are represented using a two axis model with 
exciter, power system stabilizer, and turbine-governor representation. Real power loads 
are represented as constant current, and reactive power loads are represented as constant 
impedance. This example does not include the effects of remedial actions that would 
normally be used under these conditions. 
Eleven graphs are presented in .Appendix Figures .A..2 thru A.7 present limiting 
operating point functions (lopf) for the following exciter types: DC. .A.C and Static. 
These graphs are grouped by fault type and exciter type. The parameters for the 
excitation systems used are included in .Appendix .A. 
Figures .A.S thru .A.10 present how network topology affect the lopf. Here the 
impedance magnitude of the Xavajo-Moenkopi line is changed by ±20S^ to model the 
effect of electrical distance on the "returning path" between fault location and machine 
at risk of losing synchronism. We use an .AC excitation system for this portion of the 
study. 
Figures .A.11 and .A.12 present how variation of sequence impedances seen from the 
fault point affect the lopf. Here we changed the zero and negative sequence reactances at 
all fault points by ±209?. We use an .AC excitation system for this portion of the study. 
The values used for the zero and negative sequence reactances are given in .Appendix .A. 
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The analysis of the graphs follow. 
1. Static limits > AC limits > DC limits, i.e.. generation limits for units with static 
excitation systems are higher (less restrictive) than generation limits for units with 
.AC e.Kcitation system. Generation limits for units with AC excitation systems are 
higher (less restrictive) than generation limits for units with DC excitation system. 
This effect, shown in Figures .A.2 thru .A.4. is due to the higher initial response 
characteristics (higher ceiling voltage and time response) of the static and AC 
alternator exciters. 
Influence on probability of instability. Since limits corresponding to static and AC 
alternator e.xcitation systems are virtually the same when the fault is at the far-end 
of the circuit, for a given fault rate, circuits having a higher concentration of faults 
at the far-end causes diminished benefit from higher response excitation system 
performance. 
2. .\11 limiting operating point functions for all fault types and for all excitation 
system types have the same shape, concave downward. The largest 3o. "2o (all 
e.xciters) and io (DC e.xciter) fault limit is obtained in the segment 0.-5 < L < O.S. 
where L is the normalized line length, or equivalently. in the segment 0.03 < X < 
0.046. where X is per unit line reactance. The largest lo fault limit is obtained in 
the segment 0.2 < L < 0.3 . (0.012 < X < 0.017) for .AC and Static exciters. 
Influence on probability of instability: The downward concavity indicates that 
faults closer to the machine terminals are not necessarily more severe than faults 
distant from the machine terminals. This contradicts the commonly accepted as­
sumption that stability performance of the machine under study improves as faults 
become more distant from that machine terminals. This also implies that proba­
bility of instability is lower for circuits having a higher concentration of faults in 
the middle rather than at the ends. 
As expected, three phase faults, for all e.xcitation types, incur the most restrictive 
limit when the fault is located at the terminals of the machines, but three phase 
faults at the far-end of the circuit ma\- be less severe than two phase to ground 
or one phase to ground faults at the same location. For example, in Figures .\.6 
and .\.7 generation limits for different fault types at L > 0.4 (A' > 0.023) indicate 
that lo faults are more limiting than 3g faults for .AC and Static exciters. This 
is due to slower excitation system response to lo faults at L > 0.4. Consequently 
probability of instability is heavily dependent on the fault type distribution and 
studying stability performance only for three phase faults yields a poor indication 
of actual risk associated with a given operating point. 
Table 4.1 Comparison of fault severity as a function of e.\-
citation system (faults at Xavajo. L=0) 
Excitation system limits 
DC lo > 2o > 3o 
AC lo > 2o > 3o 
Static lo > 2o > 3o 
Table 4.2 Comparison of fault severity as a function of ex­
citation system (faults at Westwing. L=I) 
Excitation system limits 
DC lo > 2o > 3o 
AC 3o > 2o > lo 
Static 3o > 2o > lo 
Influence on probability of instability: Use of static or .AC exciters decrease the 
probability of instability, since lopf limits increase. .Although single line to ground 
faults have higher probability of occurrence their influence does not tend to raise 
limits under risk-based security assessment because single line to ground faults are 
more limiting than other fault types for the far-end 50-60% of the circuit. 
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4. The limits for all fault types decrease by approximately 100 MW (or 0.0^5 per unit 
change from the "base" case) when the NavajcnMoenkopi line impedance magni­
tude increases by 207(.. The limits for all fault types increase by approximately 
100 MW (a 0.0-5 per unit change from the "base" case) when the Xavajo-Moenkopi 
line impedance magnitude decreases by 20%. The lopf shapes remain unchanged 
as line impedance changes: this is shown in Figures A.S thru .A.. 10. 
The ±20% change in line impedance magnitude results in a ^oVc change in limits, 
i.e.. the limits change little with line impedance magnitude changes. 
Influence on probability of instability. The probability of instability decreases as 
line impedance decreases. 
•5. .A. ±20% change in A'o and Xo result in a negligible change in limits. The observed 
change is of the same magnitude as the tolerance used to bracket the limits (10 
MW): this is shown in Figures .A..11 thru .A..12. 
Influence on probability of instability. Changes in positive or negative sequence 
reactances have negligible influence on the probability of instability since there is 
no discernible change in lopf characteristics. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter we investigated analytical expressions of the limiting value of genera­
tion as a function of fault type and fault location. Two approaches were investigated. In 
approach .A. we explored using an expression from the transient energy function (TEF). 
Because TEF requires angles and speeds at fault clearing, this approach proved infea-
sible since these angles and speeds may only be obtained via numerical integration and 
are not available in closed form. In approach B we investigated a simple one-machine to 
infinite bus system using the equal area criterion. This approach results in an expression 
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that requires an iterative solution procedure and as such does not serve well the need of 
identifying basic factors which influence the limiting operating point functions. We con­
clude that factors influencing the limiting operating point functions are best identified 
using simulation. 
In studying the limiting operating point function we have investigated two items: 
system stability performance as a function of fault type and fault location and the effect 
on the probability of instability of sequence impedances seen from the fault point for 
unbalanced faults. e.Kcitation system type for the at "risk" generator and network topol­
ogy. The significance of the limiting operating point functions study can be summarized 
in: 
• Conclusions on stability performance: 
— Generation limits for units with static e.xcitation systems are higher (less 
restrictive) than generation limits for units with .A.C excitation system. Gen­
eration limits for units with .A.C excitation systems are higher (less restrictive) 
than generation limits for units with DC e.Kcitation system. 
— .-Ml limiting operating point functions for all fault types and for all excitation 
system types ha\-e the same shape, concave downward. The downward con­
cavity indicates that faults closer to the machine terminals are not necessarily 
more severe than faults distant from the machine terminals. This contradicts 
the commonly accepted assumption that stability performance improves as 
faults become more distant from machine terminals. 
— .-Vs expected, three phase faults, for all excitation types, incur the most re­
strictive limit when the fault is located at the terminals of the machines, but 
three phase faults at the far-end of the circuit may be less severe than two 
phase to ground or one phase to ground faults at the same location. 
•55 
• Conclusions on probability of instability: 
- The downward concavity of the limiting operating point functions implies that 
probability of instability is lower for circuits having a higher concentration of 
faults in the middle rather than at the ends. 
- Use of static or AC exciters decrease the probability of instability, since lopf 
limits increase. .Although single line to ground faults have higher probability 
of occurrence their influence does not tend to raise limits under risk-based 
security assessment because single line to ground faults are more limiting than 
other fault types for the far-end 50-609^ of the circuit. 
— The probability of instability decreases as line impedance decreases. 
— Changes in positive or negative sequence reactances have negligible influence 
on the probability of instability since there is no discernible change in lopf 
characteristics. 
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5 RISK MANAGEMENT EXAMPLE 
5.1 Introduction 
Ue use a modified version of  the IEEE Reh'abilit}- Test System to illustrate risk-based 
electric power system security assessment and to compare it with traditional determin­
istic security assessment. We determine operating limits using iso-risk contours drawn 
in the space of pre-contingency controllable parameters, effectively creating nomograms 
based on risk. Details on the the risk-based security assessment are given and a numerical 
e.Kample is presented. 
5.2 Selected scenario 
We have chosen the IEEE Reliability Test System (lEEE-RTS) [33] to illustrate 
the risk-based security assessment approach. We have done so to allow comparison 
of our method with other reliability assessment methods and techniques as well as for 
the intrinsic value of illustrating our approach using a well known and available IEEE 
standard system. The lEEE-RTS is a generic system, in the sense that it does not 
represent an e.xisting power system, but we believe that when properly modeled studies 
performed on it provide valuable general results and guidelines applicable to real systems. 
We have chosen a scenario where each of three different events, outage of a transmis­
sion line in all cases, have potential to provoke one of two different security violations: 
transient instability of machines at a nearby plant and thermal overload on a line ad­
0 1  
jacent to an outagecl circuit. This multiplicity of triggering events and outcomes allow 
illustration of composite risk at a given operating point. The following section provides 
more information on the lEEE-RTS. 
5.2.1 IEEE reliability test system 
The IEEE Reliability Test System (lEEE-RTS) is a standardized electric generation 
and transmission system used to test and compare methods and results from reliability 
analysis of various types of power systems. It has been used in bulk power system 
reliability studies since it was first published in 1979 by the .Application of Probability 
.Methods (.A-PM) Subcommittee of the IEEE Power System Engineering Committee. In 
this work we modify and use the most recent version of this system, which was published 
in 1996. called RTS-96. RTS-96 has the capability of being up to a three area RTS. 
depending on user specification determined by the application. 
5.3 Numerical example 
The modified one area lEEE-RTS. shown in Figure 5.1. is used to illustrate the 
risk-based security assessment approach. The base case has a total system load of 3192 
M\V and the line between Bus 13 and Bus 11 is considered out of service due to either 
forced or scheduled outage. .All generators are represented using the classical machine 
model except for those at Bus 13 which are represented using two a.\is machine mode! 
with e.xciter. There are three identical machines at Bus 13. each having a ma.\imum 
generation capacity of 350 MW. Real power loads are represented as constant current, 
and reactive power loads are represented as constant impedance. 
The critical parameter set. parameters that most influence the postcontingency sys­
tem performance, are real power generation at Bus 13 and pre-contingency flow on the 
line between buses 12 and 13. We define the credible contingency list to be: (event 
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1) loss of line between Bus 12 and Bus 13. (event 2) loss of line between Bus 13 aind 
Bus 23 and (event 3) loss of line between Bus 12 and Bus 23. These events may cause 
two different types of security violations: transient instability to generators at Bus 13 
(caused by events one and two) and thermal overload on the line between Bus 12 and 
Bus 13 (caused by event three). 
The deterministic limits for acceptable transient stability performance are based on 
a worst-case disturbance scenario. In this case the scenario consists of: 1) a three phase, 
four cycle fault at Bus 13 removed by clearing the line between Bus 12 and Bus 13: here 
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the limit is 202 MVV/machine and 2) a three phase, four cycle fault at Bus 13 removed 
by clearing the line between Bus 13 and Bus 23: here the limit is 204 MW/machine. In 
both cases the deterministic stability limit was identified using time domain simulation. 
Limits to avoid thermal overload depend on three parameters: generation at Bus 13. 
pre-contingency flow on the line between Bus 12 and Bus 23 (outaged line) and pre-
contingency flow on the line between Bus 12 and Bus 13 (monitored line). Given a set 
of feasible generations at Bus 13 and flows on these lines we use generation shift factors 
and line outage distribution factors [34. pp. 363-366] to calculate post-contingency flow 
on the line monitored for thermal overload, the line between buses 12 and 13. The flow 
on the line between Bus 12 and Bus 13 after the line between Bus 12 and Bus 23 is 
outaged is our post-contingency performance measure for the thermal overload problem. 
E.vplicitly. 
(o.l) 
where 
• (hi; = ^ is the line outage distribution factor when monitoring line I after outage h  a a 
on line k. 
• A// is the change in M\V flow on line /. 
• fj! is the flow on line k before it is outaged. 
• fi' is the flow on line I before it is outaged. 
• and // is the flow on line / after line k- is removed. 
The pre-outage flows on lines / and k. ff and /[. respectively, are a function of 
generation level at Bus 13 and other injections. We model the dependency on generation 
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at Bus 13 explicitly and use a consistent set of feasible flows on these lines as to reflect 
the influence on post-contingency flow of other injections on the network. 
n = f ?  +  c i u { P , - P ^ )  ( 0 . 2 )  
n  = (3.3) 
where 
• (iii = p^ I'p^  and aki = are the generation shift factors representing the 
sensitivity of the flow on line / or k to a change in generation at bus i. 
• A// and A// are the changes in MU' flow on line / or k. 
• Pi — P° is the change in generation at bus i. 
• ff and ff are the flow on line / or k before the generation change at bus 
• and fj" and fj[ are the flows on line I or k after the generation change at bus i. 
Substitute Eq. 5.2 into Eq. 5.1 to obtain 
f i = f ?  +  «/.(P ,  - P ° ) +  + ci,.( P, -P°)) (5.4) 
Eq. 5.4 is used to calculate the post-contingency flow on the line between Bus 
12 and Bus 13 when the line between Bus 12 and Bus 23 is outaged for a range of 
values of P,. The reason for making this calculation as a function of P, is so we can 
e.xpress the post-contingency performance indicator, and therefore risk, as a function 
of a precontingency parameter that is both controllable by an operator and influential 
towards the risk corresponding to the event. Thermal overload on the line between Bus 
12 and Bus 13 occurs if; 
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• the line between Bus 12 and Bus 23 is outaged. /12-13 > -iSS (4SS M\'A is the 
Short Term Emergency (STE) rating) 
• under no outage conditions. fi2~i3 > 390. from Eq. 5.2. 390 is the minimum 
continuous rating of line 12-13 
5.3.1 Probability data 
The following conditional probabilities of having a no fault when a fault occurs were 
assumed for events one and two: 0.01. 0.19. and O.S. for 3o. 2o. and lo faults respectively. 
We model the occurrence of the event line outage using a homogeneous Poisson process 
with intensity. A. of 4-5.S x 10~® outages/hour (or 0.40 outages/year x 365 x 24) for all 
lines, i.e. P(Fi) = PiFn) = P[Fz) = 45.S x 10"". We assume that a fault may occur 
anywhere on the line with the same probability, therefore, we use a discrete uniform 
distribution function to model fault location. 
5.3.2 Limiting operating point functions 
Limiting operating point functions for each fault type. 3o. 2o. and lo. can be deter­
mined for outage on the lines between Bus 13 and Bus 12 and between Bus 13 and Bus 
23 using time domain simulation to identify limits for faults located at various locations 
on the line to be cleared. The limiting operating point functions used in this case are 
illustrated in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. The limiting parameter is real power generation at 
Bus 13. 
These limiting point functions (lopf) differ from those shown in .A.ppendi.\ These 
lopf exhibit a behavior similar to those illustrated in Figure 3.1. they are monotonically 
increasing, i.e.. the limiting generation level of a no fault increases as the fault is moved 
away from the bus closest to the machine at risk of losing synchronism. We can also 
see that as the fault type changes from a 3o fault to a 2o to a lo fault the limiting 
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generation level increases. Both of these effects occur because these changes cause the 
impedance seen by the fault to increase. 
The lines between Bus 12 and Bus 13 and between Bus 13 and Bus 23 are considerably 
shorter than those studied in Chapter 4. It seems that the diminishing benefits of a high 
response excitation system, i.e.. more restrictive limits at the far end of the line, are 
associated with line length. Verification and possible quantification of this effect is 
worthy of future investigation. 
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Figure 0.2 Limiting operating point functions for an outage on the line 
between Buses 13 and 23. modified RTS-96 
5.3.3 Impact 
In the event of transient instability it is estimated that the three 350 MVV units at 
Bus 13 would be out of service for 10 hours. We assume that energy can be replaced at a 
cost of 37.5 §/M\Vh. startup fi.xed costs are estimated at SlS.OOO for all three machines 
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Figure 5.3 Limiting operating point functions for an outage on the line 
between Buses 13 and 12. modified RTS-96 
and maintenance and repair costs are estimated at S36.22.5 for all three machines^ These 
costs are direct costs to the energy producer, we assume that no load is shed due to this 
outage, thus there are no direct or indirect costs to the customer. 
The impact of thermal overload is divided into maximum and partial impact. Max­
imum impact refers to the total cost of reconductoring the line, this is needed when the 
flow on the line e.Kceeds short-time emergency rating. Maximum impact is estimated 
at SlOS.OOO per mile^. Partial impact is the impact of thermal overload for flows above 
continuous rating and below short-time emergency rating. Partial impact is assumed, 
for simplicity, to follow a linear curve as shown in Figure 5.4. a maximum partial impact 
of one third the total cost of reconductoring the line is assumed to generate the impact 
vs. limiting parameter curve. This figure is arbitrary, the point being that there is a 
deterioration on the line that must be accounted for when flows are above continuous 
'See Chapter 3 for the source of these estimates 
•See previous footnote 
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rating and below short-time emergency rating. 
5.3.4 Risk based nomograms 
Let i  =  1.2.3 denote: (event 1) loss of line between Bus 12 and Bus 13. (event 2) 
loss of line between Bus 13 and Bus 23 and (event 3) loss of line between Bus 12 and 
Bus 23. respectively. Security violation j = I denotes transient instability to generators 
at Bus 13 (caused by events one and two) and security violation j = 2 denotes thermal 
overload on the line between Bus 12 and Bus 13 (caused by event three). 
Risk of transient instability due to event one and two is denoted by /?ii(-St) and 
respectively. Risk of thermal overload is denoted by Rosist). Risk of transient 
instability is a function of generation at Bus 13 only. RiiPi^) = RulPiz) + Ri2{P\3)-
Risk of thermal overload is a function of generation at Bus 13 as well as other injections, 
the influence of which we capture as pre-e.xisting flows on the outaged and monitored 
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lines /° and in Eq. 5.4. /?2(Aa-Zfa-is-/12-23) = ^23(^3-/fi-ia-/i'2-23)- sum 
of these two risks give the composite risk of operating at point i.e.. the total risk of 
operating at 5,. R{st) = + R-iist)-
We want to draw contours of constant risk in the space of operating parameters, 
i.e.. Rist) = A'. Our operating parameters, the critical parameter set. are real power 
generation at Bus 13 and pre-contingency flow on the line between buses 12 and 13^. 
Generation at Bus 13 is an independent parameter, the pre-contingency flow on the line 
between buses 12 and 13 depends on the generation at Bus 13 as well as other injections. 
We have wTitten a computer program to draw contours of constant risk. The algo­
rithm that controls this program follows: 
1. read a set of feasible generations at Bus 13. and flows that reflect the influence 
of other injection on lines 12-13 and 13-23 /fo-ia /?3-23-
2. select a generation level at bus 13. P13 
3. calculate risk of transient instability using the limiting operating point functions 
information shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 and impact of transient instability 
4. calculate the flows on lines 12-13 and 13-23 for the selected generation level at bus 
13 using Eq. 5.4 and compute risk of thermal overload 
5. calculate total risk adding risk of transient instability and thermal overload: save 
the result 
6. repeat steps 2 to 5 for different generations at bus 13 
7. select a level of risk A' 
^\Ve could have chosen flow on the line between buses 12 and 23 instead of flow on the line between 
buses 12 and i;{. We use only one flow because we wish to generate two-dimensional nomograms. 
However, the resulting nomogram, though given in the space of P13 and /12-13, accounts for the 
influence of /12-23 and for the dependency of both flows on P13. See Eq. .5.4. 
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S. solve the equation R{st) = I\ for pre-contingency parameters 
9. draw the solution of R{st) = K in the space of pre-contingency parameters 
Figure 5.5 shows contours of constant risk, the output of our computer program, for 
an initial flow on line 12-13 of 365.4 MVA. Four iso-risk curves are shown, at risk levels 
0. 30. 100 and 170. The risk levels have units of dollars over the next hour. i.e.. the 
expected cost over the next hour in dollars. Regions under an iso-risk curve represent 
generation-flow combinations that result in risk below the risk associated to the iso-
risk curve. Notice that we obtain a considerable increment of the security region, and 
consequently substantial increase in equipment utilization, if we allow operation beyond 
the zero risk level, the deterministic level. 
5.3.5 Operating limits development 
W'e have a tool to draw nomograms based on risk: we require criteria to determine a 
threshold risk value that will define the region of acceptable operation. The boundary of 
this region consists of the operating limits corresponding to the threshold risk contour. 
Reference [16] suggests three different methods of identifying thresholds for a new 
index, as follows. 
1. Use judgment or experience based on what has previously been defined as accept­
able operating points in the past. 
2. Compute a criterion for the index in terms of other indices for which criteria are 
clearly established. 
3. Perform a cost/benefit analysis, and choose a criterion that minimizes total costs 
of providing reliability plus the costs of instability. 
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Method 1 could be applied by computing risk for acceptable operating points where 
system response to a contingency is stabilized by applying remedial action to trip a unit, 
an action which gives a "controlled impact . 
Method 2 is attractive if other criteria for stability limitations can be established. 
For example, one might propose that loss of the plant at Bus 13 (6S1 MW. generation 
at economic dispatch) for 10 hours once per year is acceptable, but loss of the plant for 
10 hours twice per year is unacceptable, so that the threshold level is bracketed between 
R= Pxl = 0.27 X ((6Sl)(10)(37.o-19.9o) + 18.000 + 36.225) = S46.910 and 2 x §46.910 
= S93.S20 .A-s another e.xample. if the security problem was undamped oscillations 
that continued unmitigated, they could result in an out of step condition, generation 
tripping, and subsecjuent load shedding via underfrequency relays. This would enable 
direct quantification of the impact in terms of the shed load. .A. risk threshold could be 
identified by "working backwards" from a threshold in terms of MW-hrs/year interrupted 
or customer-hrs/year interrupted. 
Threshold determination by method 3 could be interpreted as an optimization prob­
lem where one desires to simultaneously minimize the sum of the operating costs plus 
the risk. Equivalently. a decision can be made on the basis of expected monetary value 
[2] of the risk vs. no risk "gamble". Impact, in dollars, of the risk alternative may be 
compared against the operating costs of the no risk alternative, using a decision tree 
where the alternatives are weighted using their corresponding probability of occurrence. 
For e.Kample. the deterministic limit to avoid transient instability is 202 MVV'/machine at 
Bus 13. Operating at 202 MVV'/machine represents a penalty in operation costs since the 
un-restrained economic dispatch indicates that machines at Bus 13 should be operated 
at 227 .MVV'/machine. .Assume these machines are constrained at 202 MVVYmachine for 
10 hours every day and further assume that the cost of buying the 25 MVV'/machine 
"'The cost of replacing the energy is assumed to be 37.5 S/.\IVV'h. The cost of producing the energy 
is 19.95 S'/^IVVh. the incremental cost. 
6S 
is 37.0 S/MWh. the cost of producing the energy is 19.95 h. the incremental 
cost. The cost of adhering to the deterministic limit over one hour is. (2o)(3)(37.5-
19.95) = §1.316. Now. assume we choose to ignore the deterministic limit and operate 
the plant at 227 MW/machine. In the event of transient instability we will loose the 
plant for 10 hours incurring in a cost of (227)(3)(37.5-19.9o)(10) + IS.OOO -f 36.225 = 
§173.740. .Assuming the occurrence of faults follow an homogeneous Poisson process 
with intensity of 45.S x 10~® outages/year the probability of having no outages over 
the ne.xt hour is P(r = 0) = = 0.99995. the probability of one outage is 
P{r = 1) = 45.S X 10"^. The expected costs of the risk vs. no risk gamble are §7.96 and 
§1.316 respectively. Clearly the e.xpected costs of adhering to the deterministic limit 
exceed those of ignoring it''. 
Deciding which level of risk is acceptable is a management decision that will be 
dictated by company policy. Which method will be used to determine an acceptable 
risk threshold will depend on the company's policy towards risk. 
Once this decision is made the system operator will receive new nomograms that 
indicate the operating limits to be maintained. Figure 5.6 show contours of constant 
risk, risk level = 30. for different initial flows on line 12-13. /3 > /2 > /I. .-\.n operator 
will use this graph in the following manner. 
1. Identify the current operating point. The operating point is determined by real 
power generation at Bus 13 and existing flow on line 12-13. 
2. Identify the iso-risk contour corresponding to the existing flow. 
3. If current generation at Bus 13 and existing flow on line 12-13 e.xceed the desired 
risk averse decision maker may doubt the results of the economic analysis we have presented 
based on the idea that it does not take into account events of e.\iremely low probability but very severe 
system collapse mechanism. A defense plan against these events is presented in [1.5]. implementation 
of a similar plan may be an economically feasible way to complement the risk bcised security strategy 
proposed here since it will account for the e.xtremely low probability events which may result in very 
severe impacts. 
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risk level adjust generation at Bus 13 to move the operating point inside the 
security region. 
5.3.6 Effect of conventional system protection reliability on risk-based 
nomograms 
Eq. 3.19 gives the risk at an operating point considering unreliability of con­
ventional protection equipment. We will use Eq. 3.19 and assume ma.vimum impact, 
i.e.. loss of all generators at the generating plant, in all events to calculate the risk at 
a given operating point and compare it to the risk assuming fully reliable protection 
equipment. The impact in all cases is / = /(Kj / F, fl .\/ fl 5f) = /(Kj / F, H .\I D B Ci St) = 
I(I\J/Fi n MQ n St) = (10)(37.5) X Pgcn + .54.225. -A-lso P{st) = 1. P{Fi) = 45.S x 10"*' 
and P{Fi) = I - P(F,) = 0.9999542. 
We obtain the probability of succesful breaker operation. P { M ) .  probability of active 
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breaker failure. and probability of passive breaker failure. P{.Uo) using a Markov 
chain [26. pp. 137-161]. We chose a Markov chain to model breaker reliability because 
of the stand-b\' nature of the conventional protection system. The breaker is not under 
continuous operation: it is required to operate at a certain moment, and its success or 
failure will depend on its operating condition, its state. The Markov chain has three 
states: 0 - succesful operation. 1 - active failure and 2 - passive failure. The transition 
rates between these states are given by the active. Ai. and passive. XJ. failure rates of 
the breaker''. The breaker may: remain in state 0. the initial state, transit from state 0 
to state 1 or transit from state 0 to state 2 '. The transition matri.x. B. for the breaker 
".According to the test data for the IEEE RTS the active failure rate of a breaker is 0.0066 fail­
ures/year. the passive failure rate of a breaker is 0.0005 failures/year. 
'This is worst case scenario since we do not allow transition from the failure states to the successful 
operation state, i.e.. we assume there is no inspection of the breaker during its service period. 
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is: 
1 — Ai — A2 Aj A2 
B= 0 10 
0 0 1 
The transition matrix corresponding to one hour transition intervals is: 
0.99999919 753.42 x 10"® 57.08 x 10"^ 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
The probabilities of being at each possible state after one year are Psreo =  P q x gs760 ^ 
(0.9997 0.0003 0.0000). Thus. P ( . \ [ )  = 0.9997 = P { B ) ,  P(-\7) = 0.0003 and P ( M O )  =  
0.0000. Substitution of these values into Eq. 3.19 results in 
\ - 6  
r(st) = ^ ^ ^ "^5.8 x 10" 
v j  vt 
The same calculation assuming fully reliable protection equipment yields 
(5.5) 
/?(^,) = ^ / X 45.S X 10"® (5.6) 
vj vi 
There is no discernible increment in probability of insecurity, and therefore on the 
ri.sk. This is because of the high reliability of conventional protection systems. 
Flow unreliable must the conventional protection system be to influence the risk of 
an operating point ? .-Vssuming an active failure rate as 0.066 and a passive failure 
rate as 0.005 failures /year, respectively (an order of magnitude increment ^) the prob-
al)ilities of being at each possible state after one year become PGREO = /o ^ _ 
(0.997 0.00-2S 0.0002). Thus. P(.U) = 0.997 = P(5). P(.\7) = 0.002S and F(.V/o) = 
0.0002. Substitution of these values into Eq. 3.19 results in 
'^This is equivalent to 66 breakers out of a 1000 failing when required to operate over the ne.xt year. 
Increasing tiie unreliability level of these devices by another order of magnitude will be unrealistic since 
an active failure rate of 0.66 failures/year implies that 660 breakers out of a 1000 will fail when required 
to operate over the next year. Such unreliable devices will not be put to use. 
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R { s r )  =  Y . Y , ^  ^  
Vj Vi 
The increment in probability of insecurity is in the order of I x 10"'. .Assume a 
maximum impact of S200.000. then Rii>t) = 9.IS dollars over the next hour for unre­
liable protection systems and R{j>t) = 9.16 dollars over the next hour for fully reliable 
protection systems. The risk based nomograms obtained considering unreliability of 
conventional protection equipment will be indistinguishable from those considering fully 
reliable protection equipment. 
5.4 Summary 
We have used the IEEE Reliability Test System to illustrate how to quantify the 
risk associated with a given operating point. Using contours of constant risk in the 
space of operating parameters we provide a risk management tool that allows corporate 
managers to justify decisions to operate beyond deterministic operating limits when 
it is economically advantageous to do so. New nomograms based on risk rather than 
deterministic limits are produced and the change is transparent to the system operator. 
.•\n important feature of the risk-based nomogram is that we can automatically draw 
them accounting for dependencies between critical parameters. Our analysis of the effect 
of conventional system protection unreliability on risk-based nomograms shows that 
these are indistinguishable from those considering fully reliable protection equipment. 
Therefore assuming fully reliable protection equipment simplifies risk calculations and 
yields an acceptable risk value. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
6.1 Contributions of this work 
We have developed a method that allows risk-based security assessment in an op­
erating environment considering any type of security violation. This method explicitly 
calculates the risk of an operating point and permits, if desired, the inclusion of reliability 
of protection equipment in the risk calculation. 
.An integral part of the risk-based security cissessment method is the calculation 
of probability of insecurity. We have developed, using probability theory, expressions 
to calculate the conditional probability of insecurity given a fault occurs for thermal 
overloads and two approaches for computing probability of transient instability; one 
based on Law of Total Probability and the other on Cartesian products. Our method 
to calculate probability of insecurity uses a minimum amount of statistical data, the 
frequency of faults and their type on a circuit, data known to be gathered by utilities. 
We present a simple method that is tractable thus avoiding the need of calculating 
probabilities using computationally intensive methods. 
.A.lso. in contrast with previous work on probabilistic stability assessment, our purpose 
of calculating probability of instability is to use it with the impact of instability, i.e. 
to calculate risk of operating at a specific operating point. Calculating probability 
of instability is only one step towards the use of risk as a decision making tool, a 
management tool. .Accounting for impact of instability leads to the development of a 
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concise statement of the security-economics tradeoff problem. 
We introduced the concept of limiting operating point functions, curves used to 
calculate probability of transient instability that include within them information on 
operating point, probability and system stability performance. We investigated how 
excitation systems and other parameters affect the limiting operating point functions. 
Using our risk-based security assessment method we can draw contours of constant 
risk in the space of operating parameters. These contours can be used as a risk-
management tool, allowing managers to justify decisions to operate beyond deterministic 
operating limits when it is economically advantageous to do so. Once an acceptable level 
of risk is identified we can generate nomograms based on risk rather than deterministic 
limits. The change from deterministic to risk-based operating limits is transparent to 
system operators since they just see new nomograms or tables. 
Finally, we provided an example illustrating how to implement the risk-based security 
assessment method using a modified version of the IEEE-Reliability Test System 1996. 
6.2 Suggestions for future work 
In this work we developed a general method to perform risk-based security assessment 
in operating environment and focused on transient instability and thermal overloads as 
the security violations of interest. It will be of great interest to include voltage and 
oscillatory instability problems in this scheme. 
The effect of special protection scheme (SPS) reliability on risk of transient instability 
is currently under investigation at Iowa State University. Other promising topics of 
investigation are calculating risk for planning purposes, where the operating points for 
which risk is calculated are not deterministic but follow a probability distribution, and 
obtaining risk when the critical parameters set has high cardinality. 
In our study of limiting operating point functions we did not consider the effect of 
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changing the voltage profile of the study area. These variations in the voltage profile 
may influence the behavior and characteristics of the limiting operating point functions 
and may prove worthy of future investigation. 
We suggest further work to enhance the determination of a threshold risk value that 
would provide for identification of the desired operating limits by calculation of the 
appropriate iso-risk contours. In order to determine a risk threshold it may be benefitial 
to identify thresholds on probability and impact, i.e.. to have three threshold values; 
• Probability threshold: Identify a minimum probability threshold below which the 
effects of the contingency would be excluded from the composite risk calculation 
used to determine operating limits. This implies that we do not include the effects 
of low probability events, regardless of the impact. 
• Impact threshold: Identify a maximum impact threshold for ev^ents with nonnegli-
gible probability (as identified by the probability threshold). E.\amples of impact 
which would exceed this impact threshold may be those which will result in loss 
of life, heavy equipment damage or trip of a nuclear unit. .\n operating point 
is unacceptable if an event with nonnegligible probability would cause an impact 
that exceeds this threshold. Contingencies with impact greater than this threshold 
will have zero-risk (deterministic) limits. 
• Risk threshold itself: .-X threshold to be applied to those events with probability 
greater than the probability threshold and impact less than the impact threshold. 
It should be noted that selection of a probability (minimum) threshold and an impact 
(maximum) threshold does not determine the risk threshold. The probability and impact 
thresholds are set without regard to the benefits associated with an operating condition: 
the risk threshold is. however, operating point dependent. Efforts to standarize these 
76 
thresholds, or the procedures to identify them, may prove benefitial for the entire electric 
power industry. 
Finally, assuming that actual line outage data can be obtained, a goodness of fit 
study on different possible models to find another distributions for the occurrence of 
line outages (possible probabilistic models are Weibull. Log normal. Log logistic) is 
recommended. This effort may prove beneficial if we consider the possibility of using 
hazard functions to reconcile statistical data collection on a yearly basis and use of this 
data on an hour basis. 
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APPENDIX A LIMITING OPERATING POINT 
FUNCTIONS STUDY RESULTS 
Study system 
O 
EL DORADO 500 
1 
MOENKOPI 500 
PALO VERDE 24.0 
a 
/\/\ 
NAVAJO 26.0 
NAVAJO 500 
FOUR CORNERS 26.0 
o 
FOUR CORNERS 500 
WESTWING 500 
PALO VERDE 500 
Figure A.l One-line diagram of the study system: a 500 kV system local 
to the Navajo Power Plant in Arizona 
Table A.l Line impedances of the study system 
line impedance 
FOURCO RXERS-MO EXKO PI O.OOISO + j 0.041S9 
XAVAJO-MOEXKOPI 0.0007S -1-j O.OlSl-5 
VVESTWIXG-MO EX KO PI 0.001S4 + j 0.04244 
ELDORADO-MOEXKOPI 0.00222 + j 0.049-59 
PALOVERDE-WESTWIXG 0.00040 + j 0.00960 (2 lines) 
XAN'A.JO-VVESTWIXG 0.0025o + j 0.0.5S6o 
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Figure A.2 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. three excita­
tion system types and lo faults 
1 02 
0.98 
static. 2pn 
092 
09 
088 
086 -
0 006 001 
Navaio 
Figure A.3 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. three excita­
tion system types and 2o faults 
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Figure A.4 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. three excita­
tion system types and 3o faults 
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Figure A.o Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. three fault 
types and DC exciter system 
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Figure A.6 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. three fault 
types and .AC exciter system 
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Figure .A.7 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. three fault 
types and Static exciter system 
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Figure A.S Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. Xavajo 500 
Moenkopi 500 impedance change and lo faults 
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Figure .A..9 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. Xavajo 500 
Moenkopi 500 impedance change and 2o faults 
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Figure .A.. 10 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. Xavajo 500 -
Moenkopi 500 impedance change and 3o faults 
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Figure .A..11 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. zero and neg­
ative sequence impedance change and lo faults 
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Figure A.12 Comparison of limiting operating point funtions. zero and neg­
ative sequence impedance change and 2o faults 
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Parameters used in the study 
Table A.2 DC commutator exciter parameters 
(Type DCIA) 
Ka = 46.0 TA = 0.06 = 1-00 
^ RMi.y = -0.9 TE = 0.46 SEi = 0.33 
SE. = 0.1 EpDi — 3-10 A> = 0.10 
o
 
II 
Table A.3 Alternator supplied con-
trolleci-rectifier exciter parameters 
(Type AC4A) 
R'A = 200.00 TA = 0.015 
^ R.u/.v = -3.67 V/.U.A.Y = 0.300 ^ i.xrix = -0.30 
Table A.4 Potential or compound source con-
trolled-rectifier exciter with field volt­
age control loop parameters (Type 
ST3A) 
R'A = 7.93 Ta = 0.04 VR.\/.4.Y = 10.000 
^ R.urx = -10.00 ^ r.xr.AX = 0.20 
o
 
o
 
o
 1 I
I , 
h'l = 0.00 hp = 6.15 AS.\m.V = 6.900 
Ac = 0.20 l\c — 1.00 Xl = O.OSl 
^ GAA.4.V = 5.SO 
All data taken from "IEEE Recommended practice for excitation system Models for 
Power System Stability Studies". IEEE Standard -121.5-1992. 
.Note: ETMSP and IEEE Standard follow different notation. 
r, (ETMSP) = T M  (IEEE Standard) 
A'., (ETMSP) = K M  (IEEE Standard) 
h'j (ETMSP) = [\A (IEEE Standard) 
The values of A'o and A') at Xa\-ajo 500 and Moenkopi 500 were provided by .Arizona 
Public Service planning engineers. Intermediate values were calculated assuming a 
linear distribution of these parameters over the Xavajo-Westwing line. 
S4 
Table A.5 Zero and negative sequence reactances at differ­
ent points over the Xavajo 500 - West wing 500 
line [L = 0 at Xavajo 500, L = I at Westwing 
500) 
location L = 0 L  =  1 / 4  L = 1/2 L = 3/4 L = 1 
Ao 0.0033 0.003S 0.0042 0.0047 0.0051 
-V> 0.0049 0.0046 0.0044 0.0041 0.003S 
APPENDIX B RECONDUCTORING COSTS 
Information from Commonwealth Edison Company 
In 1992 ComEcl reconducted a 13SkV. L11609. 300 Kcmil copper conductor to 1113 
Kcmil 45/7 ACSR conductor, from Electric Junction to Frontenac. a distance of 4.5 
miles for an increase in capacity requirement^ 
The following material and construction costs are based on this project. 
Table B.l ComEd reconductoring project: material and construction costs 
(reconductoring only) 
materials conductor = 75.000 feet S 100.000 
hardware = clamps, arm steel, 
dampers, shackles, etc. 
S20.000 
Total §120.000 
construction conductor removal and 
disposal, no salvage 
§40.000 
conductor installation 
includes; guard poles 
temporary dead-ends arm 
reinforcements, etc. 
§50.000 X 4.5 = §224.870 
Total §264.870 
Therefore the total cost to reconduct a 4.5 mile line (assumes S structures per mile) 
= §3S4.S70. The cost per mile is approximately SS6.000 (conductor only). 
The following additional items were installed also: two dead end towers at each end 
'This information was provided by R.P. Schlueter, Commonwealth Edison Company. 125 South 
Clark Street. P.O. Bo.k 767. Chicago IL 60690-0767 via correspondence with Glenn Hillesland. .Adjunct 
Professor. Iowa State University on July. 18 1996. 
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of the line. This was required to provide additional capacity to carry higher tension to 
meet NESC regulations for clearances. .All existing porcelain insulators were changed to 
13SkV' polymer insulators (silicon type) plus grounding and static wire replacement. 
The cost for materials and construction for doing this work was: 
Table B.2 ComEd reconductoring project: material and con­
struction costs (dead end towers installation) 
two tower foundations 
two towers 
§60.000 
§42.000 
insulators (§120 a piece) §12.000 
Change of static wire from 134.6 Kcmil .A.CSR to 7#S 
.A.lwd.. installation 
materials (for 4.5 miles) 
§55.000 
§16.000 
Ground rods reinstallation §30.000 
Total costs of the project were: 
Table B.3 ComEd reconductoring project: material and con­
struction costs (Total) 
conductor only §384.870 
tower work §102.000 
insulator work §12.000 
static wire and grounds §71.000 
Total (This cost does not include switching or inspection 
costs, usually or 6% of total cost of the project.) 
§569.870 
.All work was completed in 4 calendar months. The project was performed by outside 
contractors with ComEd inspection. .-Ml materials supplied by ComEd. 
The total cost of the project was 126.638 dollars/mile. 
Information jfrom Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
PG<L'E planning engineers inform that per unit costs do not address the cost to 
reconductor a line since it can vary significantly if towers need to be strengthened or 
S( 
poles interset. For the more straightforward jobs, they suggest about 100-150 thousand 
dollars per circuit mile". Approximate costs of building new lines and costs of replacing 
termination equipment when reconducting follow. 
Table B.4 PG.L'E costs of building new lines 
60 and 70 k\' single circuit wood pole - 397.5 kcmil 
N'o underbuild 
Underbuild 
Overbuild 
Sr25.000/mile 
Sl66.000/mile 
•Sl.96.000/mile 
60 and 70 kV single circuit wood pole - 715.5 kcmil 
.\o underbuild 
Underbuild 
Overbuild 
Sl33.000/mile 
Sl73.000/mile 
S204.000/mile 
115 k\' single circuit wood pole - 715.5 kcmil 
No underbuild 
Underbuild 
Overbuild 
Sl42.000/mile 
§18S.000/mile 
s21S.000/mile 
115 k\' DCTL - 715.5 kcmil 
One circuit installed 
Two circuits installed 
Install second circuit 
§251.000/mile 
S31S.000/mile 
SS4.000/mile 
230 k\" DCTL - 1113 kcmil .A.1 
One circuit installed 
Two circuits installed 
Install second circuit 
s364.000/mile 
S463.000/mile 
-S117.000/mile 
230 k\' DCTL - 1113 .A.1 (2 conductor bundled) 
One circuit installed 
Two circuits installed 
Install second circuit 
S533.000/mile 
S708.000/mile 
ST95.000/mile 
-This information was provided by Chifong Thomas and Robert Jenkins from Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company. Transmission Planning Department, via electronic mail to James McCalley. .\ssistant 
Professor. Iowa State University on July. 24 1996. 
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Table B.5 PG»L'E costs of line termination 
60 or 70 kV single conductor 
up to 1113 kcmil AA conductor §842.000 
115 k\' single conduction 
up to 2300 kcmil AA conductor •SI.317.000 
230 k\' DCTL 
up to 1113 kcmil AA single conductor Sl.793.000 
230 k\" DCTL 
up to 2 conductor bundled 1113 kcmil AA Sl.S2S.000 
S9 
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